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The Federalist Safeguards of Progressive Taxation 
 
Daniel J. Hemel* 
 
93 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) 
 
This essay considers the distributional consequences of the Supreme 
Court’s federalism jurisprudence over the past quarter century, focusing specifically on the anti-
commandeering, anti-coercion, and state sovereign immunity doctrines. The first of these 
doctrines prevents Congress from compelling the states to administer federal programs; the 
second prevents Congress from achieving the same result through offers that for practical 
purposes the states cannot refuse; the third prohibits Congress from abrogating state sovereign 
immunity outside a limited class of cases. These doctrines vest the states with valuable 
entitlements and allow the states to sell those entitlements back to Congress for a price. In this 
respect, the doctrines have an intergovernmental distributional effect, shifting wealth from the 
federal government to the states. 
  The distributional consequences of the anti-commandeering, anti-coercion, and state 
sovereign immunity doctrines are not purely intergovernmental, however. The doctrines also 
have potential implications for the distribution of wealth across individuals and households. By 
forcing Congress to bear a larger share of the costs of federal programs, and by shifting some of 
the costs of liability-imposing statutes from the states to Congress, these doctrines allow the 
states to raise less revenue and compel Congress to raise more. For a number of historical as well 
as structural reasons, the federal tax system is dramatically more progressive than even the most 
progressive state tax systems, and so the reallocation of fiscal responsibility resulting from these 
federalism doctrines causes more revenue-raising to occur via the more progressive system. The 
likely net effect is a shift in wealth from higher-income households (who bear a larger share of 
the federal tax burden) to lower- and middle-income households (who would have borne a 
larger share of the burden of state taxes). 
This conclusion comes with a number of caveats. The distributional consequences of 
the Supreme Court’s federalism doctrines may be moderated—or magnified—by differences in 
federal and state spending priorities. Moreover, the doctrines may affect the size of government 
as well as the allocation of fiscal responsibility across levels of government (though the net effect 
on government size is ambiguous). And the doctrines may have distributional consequences that 
are not only interpersonal, but also intergenerational. What seems clear from the analysis in this 
essay is that federalism doctrines affect the distribution of income and wealth in subtle and 
sometimes unexpected ways, and that a comprehensive understanding of wealth inequality in 
the United States requires careful attention to key features of our fiscal constitution. 
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Introduction 
 
 The anti-commandeering doctrine and its close cousin, the anti-coercion rule, have taken 
on new life in the age of Trump. The first of these, the anti-commandeering doctrine, holds that 
the federal government cannot compel states to pass particular laws or implement particular 
programs. While the anti-commandeering doctrine still allows the federal government to pay 
(one might say “bribe”) the states to carry out federal policies, the anti-coercion rule places a limit 
on that power: “the financial inducement offered by Congress” cannot be “so coercive as to pass 
the point at which pressure turns into compulsion.”1 Both of these doctrines historically have had 
a particular ideological valence: Noah Feldman describes them as doctrines “developed by 
conservative justices to thwart progressive results.”2 Both of these doctrines assume very different 
roles with President Trump in power: they (potentially) prevent President Trump from forcing 
“sanctuary cities” to aid in the deportation of undocumented immigrants.3 
 
 Or so goes the conventional wisdom among commentators writing in the wake of 
Trump’s November 2016 electoral victory. And for the most part, the conventional wisdom goes 
unchallenged here. It is true that the anti-commandeering rule was crystallized in the case of 
Printz v. United States,4 where it was used to strike down provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act that required state and local law enforcement officers to run background checks 
on prospective handgun purchasers. It is also true that Printz was a 5-4 decision pitting the 
Court’s more conservative members against its more liberal faction, with Justice Scalia writing 
the majority opinion. The anti-commandeering doctrine is now being wielded as a shield by 
opponents of President Trump’s bid to withhold federal funds from state and local governments 
that decline to cooperate with federal efforts to deport undocumented immigrants.5 And so it is 
quite reasonable to conclude that “Antonin Scalia might have saved sanctuary cities.”6 
  
Likewise, it is true that the anti-coercion rule was first invoked to invalidate federal 
legislation in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the 2012 case in which the 
Supreme Court upheld some elements of the Affordable Care Act and struck down others. 
Specifically, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in NFIB concluded that Congress could not require 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
2 Noah Feldman, Sanctuary Cities Are Safe, Thanks to Conservatives, Bloomberg View (Nov. 29, 2016), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-11-29/sanctuary-cities-are-safe-thanks-to-
conservatives. 
3 The City of San Francisco relies heavily on anti-commandeering and anti-coercion principles in its 
ongoing challenge to President Trump’s January 25, 2017 executive order on sanctuary cities. See 
Complaint, City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, No. 17-485 (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 31, 2017). For 
Trump’s sanctuary cities order, see Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
4 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
5 See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Why Trump’s Executive Order on Sanctuary Cities Is Unconstitutional, Wash. 
Post: Volokh Conspiracy (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2017/01/26/constitutional-problems-with-trumps-executive-order-on-sanctuary-
cities/?utm_term=.ded911f57192. 
6 Eric Levitz, Antonin Scalia Might Have Saved Sanctuary Cities, N.Y. Mag.: Daily Intelligencer (Nov. 
29, 2016), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/11/antonin-scalia-might-have-saved-sanctuary-
cities.html. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2943713 
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states receiving federal Medicaid funding to extend coverage to adults with incomes below 133 
percent of the poverty level: the “financial inducement” offered by the Affordable Care Act—
expand coverage or else lose all Medicaid funding—was, according to Chief Justice Roberts, “a 
gun to the head.”7 The effect of that holding was to block an important element of President 
Obama’s signature legislative achievement: ultimately, 19 states would opt out of the Affordable 
Care Act’s Medicaid expansion after NFIB.8 And while this part of the Chief Justice’s opinion 
was joined by two Democratic appointees, Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan, their votes 
were branded as “defections” from the liberal camp.9 Now, however, the same anti-coercion rule 
stands in President Trump’s way if and as he tries to deny federal funds to sanctuary cities. As 
Professor Feldman puts it: “Behold the revenge of conservative federalism: Judge-made doctrines 
developed to protect states’ rights against progressive legislation can also be used to protect cities 
against Trump’s conservative policies. Ain’t constitutional law grand?”10	  
 
  Yet even before President Trump came to power, the “conservative federalism” 
doctrines to which Feldman refers may have been advancing progressive objectives in more 
subtle ways. This essay argues that the anti-commandeering and anti-coercion doctrines plus a 
third one—the state sovereign immunity doctrine—play an underappreciated role as safeguards 
of progressive taxation. The “revenge of conservative federalism,” I suggest, was raging from the 
start, long before Donald Trump was in the White House or even on reality TV. 
 
Such a claim may seem surprising at first blush: after all, federalism generally entails a 
shift of power toward the states, and state-level taxation is (as discussed in more detail below) 
significantly less progressive than federal taxation. And like most first impressions, this first 
impression is half-right: state-level taxation is indeed much less progressive than federal taxation. 
But the effect of federalism doctrines (and specifically, the anti-commandeering, anti-coercion, 
and state sovereign immunity doctrines) is not to increase our reliance on relatively regressive 
state-level taxes. Quite the opposite: federalism doctrines, this essay argues, shift revenue-raising 
toward the more progressive federal system.  
 
The argument proceeds as follows: I begin by highlighting the stark contrast between the 
ways that Congress and the states structure their tax systems. Effective federal tax rates rise 
steadily over the income distribution. The opposite is true at the state level: state taxes (and taxes 
imposed by local governments—instrumentalities of the state) are generally flat or regressive over 
the income distribution in effective-rate terms. This contrast can be attributed to a number of 
factors: the fear that a state’s richest residents will leave if the state imposes highly progressive 
taxes; the corollary fear that low-income individuals and families will flow in if a state adopts too 
generous a redistributive scheme; and the constraint imposed by state constitutions that place 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604. 
8 See Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, Henry J. Kaiser Family Found. (Jan. 1, 
2017), http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-
affordable-care-act. 
9 Dahlia Lithwick, Where Is the Liberal Outrage?, Slate (July 6, 2012), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/07/while_conservatives_are_furi
ous_about_john_roberts_health_care_decision_liberals_are_silent_about_the_defections_from_the_supre
me_court_s_liberal_justices_.html. 
10 See Somin, supra note 2. 
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limits on progressive income taxation. The gap between the federal and state systems is so wide 
that even the most progressive state tax systems are significantly less progressive than their federal 
counterpart.  
 
 I then go on to explain how the Supreme Court’s federalism decisions—particularly in 
the anti-commandeering, anti-coercion, and sovereign immunity contexts—vest the states with 
valuable entitlements protected by a “property rule” (to borrow a phrase from Guido Calabresi 
and Douglas Melamed11). In the anti-commandeering and anti-coercion contexts, the relevant 
entitlement is the states’ control over their own legislative processes and administrative 
capabilities. In the sovereign immunity context, the relevant entitlement is the states’ control over 
whether they can be sued by private citizens. There are, to be sure, limits on the latter 
entitlement: Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the Reconstruction 
Amendments in certain contexts,12 and can also do so pursuant to the Constitution’s Bankruptcy 
Clause.13 Yet in the mine-run of cases, the states—not Congress—get to decide whether states 
can be sued by private citizens in state and federal court. 
 
Importantly, the entitlements allocated to the states by federalism doctrines are tradeable 
entitlements: the states can sell these entitlements to Congress, though Congress cannot seize the 
entitlements outside of a voluntary exchange. (This is what it means for the entitlement to be 
protected by a property rule rather than a liability rule or an inalienability rule.) And as Aziz 
Huq observes, these federalism doctrines “leave open the possibility that states can engage in 
mutually beneficial trading with Congress.”14 When members of Congress believe that the 
benefits of having the states enact or administer a particular program are greater than the costs to 
the states of enacting or administering the program, Congress can purchase the states’ 
entitlement for a price. Such exchanges are indeed quite common, with Congress effectively 
hiring the states to administer Medicaid, the SNAP/Food Stamp Program, and the Federal-State 
Unemployment Insurance Program (among countless others), and effectively paying the states to 
enact measures such as a minimum legal drinking age of 21.15 Likewise, when members of 
Congress believe that the benefits of having the states waive sovereign immunity in a particular 
context are greater than the costs to the states of liability, Congress can effectively buy such 
waivers.16 The anti-coercion principle acts as something of an “unconscionability doctrine” 
regulating such exchanges—the bargain cannot be on terms too lopsided. But for the most part, 
tradeability is the norm and judicial intervention the exception. 
 
 Yet the possibility of bargaining between Congress and the states does not make the initial 
allocation of entitlements irrelevant. By assigning valuable entitlements to the states rather than 
the federal government, these federal doctrines generate potentially significant distributive effects. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1092 (1972). 
12 See Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Who’s Afraid of the Eleventh Amendment? The Limited Impact 
of the Court’s Sovereign Immunity Rulings, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 213, 239-47 (2006). 
13 See Cent. Va. Comm. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006). 
14 Aziz Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1595, 1635 (2014). 
15 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
16 See Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2005) (§ 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act); Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1999) (Title IX). 
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Per the Coase theorem, whether a court assigns the property right over a particular plot to the 
farmer or the rancher will not—in the absence of transaction costs—affect whether the farmer 
plants crops or the cattle-raiser allows his cows to graze on the plot; the court’s allocation of the 
entitlement will, however, affect whether the farmer pays the rancher (or vice versa).17 So too in 
the intergovernmental context: The initial allocation of entitlements between Congress and the 
states will not necessarily determine who administers federal programs or whether states can be 
sued by private citizens. The allocation of entitlements will, however, very much affect the 
intergovernmental flow of funds, even if states and the federal government can engage in 
municipally beneficial trading ex post. 
 
More precisely, the allocation of entitlements to states rather than to Congress enriches 
the states relative to the federal government: now the states can sell their entitlements when they 
want to and never have to buy them. In this respect, federalism doctrines yield an 
intergovernmental distributive effect much like the interpersonal distributive effect in Coase’s 
classic example. The anti-commandeering doctrine does not necessarily mean that states will stop 
administering federal programs, nor does the state sovereign immunity doctrine mean that states 
will no longer be subject to suit by private citizens. These doctrines do mean, though, that the 
states need not relinquish these entitlements unless they get paid (and, per the anti-coercion rule, 
the bargain must be more than a holdup). 
 
But why should the intergovernmental distributional consequences of the Supreme 
Court’s federalism doctrines affect the interpersonal distribution of wealth? Here, the contrast 
between federal-level progressivity and state-level regressivity returns to the analysis. The 
allocation of valuable entitlements to the states rather than the federal government allows the 
states to tax less and forces the federal government to tax more. And so to a first approximation, 
federalism doctrines that allocate valuable entitlements to the states cause more revenue-raising 
to occur through the more progressive federal tax system, with the consequence that the rich pay 
a larger share.  
 
This claim must be accompanied by a number of qualifications. First, the progressivity of 
the federal and state tax systems may depend in part on the amount of revenue-raising that 
occurs through federal and state channels. Second, redistribution of resources across levels of 
government may alter the composition of federal and state spending in ways that affect the 
interpersonal distribution of wealth. Third, the anti-commandeering, anti-coercion, and state 
sovereign immunity doctrines may affect not only the allocation of revenue-raising 
responsibilities but also the overall size of government (though the direction of the effect is, as 
discussed below, theoretically and empirically ambiguous). Fourth, the distribution of revenue-
raising responsibilities across levels of government may also affect the distribution of revenue-
raising burdens across generations, as the federal government generally has greater leeway to 
finance current spending through debt (and thus to shift the burden of revenue raising to future 
taxpayers). Fifth, and finally, the federalism doctrines upon which this essay focuses may operate 
alongside the “political safeguards of federalism” to which this essay’s title alludes.18 These 
qualifications are all explained and explored in greater detail below. Ultimately, however, none 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960). 
18 Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Rôle of the States in the Composition 
and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954). 
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of these qualifications should lead us to disregard the top-line conclusion that federalism’s 
allocation of valuable entitlements to state governments pushes in a progressive distributional 
direction. 
 
The rest of the essay proceeds as follows. Part I provides relevant background on 
redistribution at the federal and state level. It explains why state and local governments are 
widely thought to be less capable than the federal government of shifting wealth from rich to 
poor. Part II introduces the anti-commandeering, anti-coercion, and state sovereign immunity 
doctrines, and explains how these doctrines allocate entitlements across levels of government. 
Part III presents a rudimentary model of federal and state taxing and spending, and shows how 
reallocations of valuable entitlements across levels of government may affect individual tax 
burdens. Part IV considers complications and qualifications, including the effect of federalism 
doctrines on the structure of state and federal tax systems, the composition of spending, the 
overall size of government, and the allocation of fiscal burdens across generations. Part IV also 
discusses the relationship between federalism’s judicial and political safeguards. I conclude by 
situating the present analysis within broader debates about inequalities of income and wealth. 
 
I.  Redistribution at the Federal and State Level 
 
 Despite news stories about billionaires paying nothing in federal income taxes19 (or paying 
a lower effective rate than their secretaries20), the fact of the matter is that the federal tax system 
is steeply progressive. By virtually any measure, effective federal tax rates (i.e., taxes as a 
percentage of income) rise over the income distribution, with the rich paying more than the poor. 
The opposite is true at the state level: by virtually any measure, effective state and local tax rates 
decline over the income distribution, with the poor paying higher rates than the rich. Section I.A 
illustrates the stark contrast between federal-level progressivity and state-level regressivity. 
Sections I.B and I.C discuss structural and institutional explanations for the divergence. 
 
A.  Data 
 
 Figure 1 compares effective federal and state tax rates across the income distribution. I 
rely on two sources for estimates of effective federal rates: the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy 
Center’s Microsimulation Model21 and the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP) 
Tax Model.22 Figure 1 also shows the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center’s projection of 
effective federal tax rates across the income distribution under the tax plan proposed by then-
candidate Trump during the 2016 campaign, as well as ITEP’s estimate of effective state tax 
rates across the income distribution. (Unfortunately, the Urban-Brookings model does not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See Steve Eder & Megan Twohey, Donald Trump Acknowledges Not Paying Federal Income Taxex 
for Years, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/10/us/politics/donald-trump-
taxes.html. 
20 See Chris Isidore, Buffett Says He’s Still Paying Lower Tax Rate Than His Secretary, CNN Money 
(Mar. 4, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/03/04/news/economy/buffett-secretary-taxes. 
21 Jim Nunns et al., Tax Policy Ctr., An Analysis of Donald Trump’s Revised Tax Plan 10 tbl.4 (Oct. 18, 
2016). 
22 See Citizens for Tax Justice, Who Pays Taxes in America 2016? (Apr. 12, 2016), 
http://ctj.org/ctjreports/taxday2016.pdf. 
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include a state tax component, and ITEP has not produced its own projection of the Trump 
plan.)  
 
Figure 1. Effective Tax Rates at Federal and State Level, by Income Group 
(Current Law and Trump Plan)23 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Details in text. 
0%	  5%	  
10%	  15%	  
20%	  25%	  
30%	  35%	  
40%	  
Ef
fe
ct
iv
e	  
Ta
x	  
Ra
te
s	  
Family	  Cash	  Income	  Percentile	  Federal	  (Current;	  TPC)	   Federal	  (Trump;	  TPC)	  State	  (ITEP)	   Federal	  (ITEP)	  
	   8 
An important caveat is that any calculation of effective tax rates will require a number of 
debatable assumptions about the distribution of tax burdens across households.24 However, the 
basic contrast between federal and state effective rates remains robust to a number of alternative 
specifications.25 The claim that the federal tax system is significantly more progressive than all 
state tax systems cannot be seriously disputed. Indeed, the difference between federal and state 
rates is so stark that even if Congress enacted the tax plan proposed by Trump without 
modification, the federal system would remain significantly more progressive than its state 
counterparts.  
 
Concededly, the comparison between the progressivity of the federal system and the 
regressivity of state systems masks the considerable variation across different states. The state 
ranked by ITEP as the most regressive, Washington, has effective rates that decline sharply 
across the income distribution, with the bottom quintile paying an effective rate of 16.8% and the 
top percentile paying an effective rate of only 2.8%. The state ranked by ITEP as the most 
progressive in terms of its tax system, Delaware, has a roughly flat tax structure, with families in 
the bottom quintile paying rates slightly lower than families in the top percentile (5.5% versus 
6.4%).26 Note that even the most progressive state tax system is significantly less progressive than 
the federal system—and would remain so even if the Trump campaign plan were implemented 
in full.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The difficulty arises from the fact that who pays a tax and who bears the burden of the tax are not 
necessarily the same. For example, the federal government imposes a 15.3% payroll tax, with half the tax 
(7.65%) technically paid by employers and the other half technically paid by employees. See Ctr. on 
Budget and Policy Priorities, Policy Basics: Federal Payroll Taxes (Mar. 3, 2016), 
http://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/policy-basics-federal-payroll-taxes. There is little reason to 
believe, though, that the technical half-and-half split has anything to do with the actual burden of the 
payroll tax. (Indeed, the general view is that most or all of the burden of the payroll tax falls on labor, at 
least in the short run. See Deborah A. Geier, Integrating the Tax Burdens of the Federal Income and 
Payroll Taxes on Labor Income, 22 Va. Tax. Rev. 1, 17 & n.47 (2002) (compiling sources).) Determining 
the burden of the corporate income tax is even more challenging: some portion of the tax potentially falls 
on labor rather than shareholders, but no one knows precisely how much. See Julie Anne Cronin et al., 
Distributing the Corporate Income Tax: Revised U.S. Treasury Methodology, 66 Nat’l Tax J. 239 (2013). 
25 For example, the Tax Foundation’s calculations would suggest that state and local tax systems are 
slightly less regressive than the ITEP model indicates. See, e.g., Liz Malm, Comments on “Who Pays? A 
Distributional Analysis of the Tax Systems in All 50 States,” Tax Found. (Feb. 20, 2013), 
https://taxfoundation.org/comments-who-pays-distributional-analysis-tax-systems-all-50-states. But even 
under the Tax Foundation’s methodology, effective rates at the state and local level decline modestly as 
income increases, while effective rates at the federal level rise sharply as income increases. See id.; Tax 
Found., Facts & Figures: How Does Your State Compare? tbl. 10 (2015), 
https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/Fact%26Figures_15_web_9_2.pdf. 
26 These statistics and the data in Figure 2 are drawn from Inst. on Taxation & Econ. Policy, Who Pays? 
A Distributional Analysis of the Tax Systems in All 50 States (5th ed. 2015), 
http://www.itep.org/pdf/whopaysreport.pdf. The percentages in text and in Figure 3 are “without 
federal offset”: i.e., they reflect taxes paid to state and local governments, without an adjustment for the 
fact that state and local tax payments generate a valuable federal income tax deduction for some 
taxpayers. Adding in federal offsets makes the state systems appear to be even more regressive, because 
higher-income taxpayers benefit disproportionately from itemized deductions. Note that the 2015 ITEP 
report only includes taxpayers under age 65. For an explanation of the reasons why ITEP excludes older 
taxpayers, see Inst. on Taxation & Econ. Policy, supra, at 19. 
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Figure 2. Effective State Tax Rates in Most and Least Progressive States (2015) 
 
 
Another way of illustrating the difference between the federal and state tax systems is by 
focusing on the percentage of taxes paid by each income group. In other words: For each $1 of 
tax revenues raised by federal (state) governments, what percentage comes from taxpayers in the 
bottom quintile, what percentage from taxpayers in the next quintile, and so on? Figure 3 shows 
these percentage shares using the ITEP model. As Figure 3 illustrates, taxpayers in the bottom 
four quintiles pay a larger share of state taxes than of federal taxes; taxpayers in the top decile 
pay a larger share of federal taxes than of state taxes; and taxpayers in the 80th to 90th 
percentiles pay approximately the same share of federal taxes as of state taxes. 
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Figure 3. Share of Federal and State Taxes, by Income Group (2016) 
 
 
Table 1 reproduces Figure 3 in textual format, along with two additional columns. For 
purposes of the analysis in this essay, the last two columns are key. Shifting an additional $1 of 
revenue raising from the state systems to the federal system will, all else equal, mean that families 
in the top percentile pay an additional 7.9 cents in total taxes while families in the bottom 
quintile pay 3.7 cents less in total taxes. Note that the federal government transferred 
approximately $666.7 billion to states and their subdivisions in fiscal year 2016.27 The final 
column in Table 1 shows what a difference it would make to families in each income group if 
that $666.7 billion had been raised through state tax systems instead. Holding the structure of 
federal and state tax systems constant, such a shift would mean that families in the bottom 
quintile would see their after-tax incomes decline by 4.1% of cash income, while families in the 
top percentile would see their after-tax incomes rise by 2.0% of cash income.28 On this view, the 
fact that $666.7 billion is raised through the federal tax systems rather than state tax systems has 
a significant impact on the after-tax distribution of wealth in the United States.    
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See Christopher Chantrill, Government Spending Details, usgovernmentspending.com (last visited Feb. 
25, 2017). Chantrill’s site reproduces data from federal sources in an easy-to-use format. 
28 U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, Distribution Table 2016 001: Distribution of 
Families, Cash Income, and Federal Taxes Under 2016 Current Law (July 23, 2015). 
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Table 1. Difference in Federal and State Tax Shares 
Income 
Group 
% Federal 
Taxes  
(2016) 
% State 
Taxes  
(2016) 
Difference  
(% Federal – % State) 
Difference x 
Transfer as % 
of Cash Income 
0%-20% 1.2% 4.1% -2.9% -4.1% 
20%-40% 4.2% 7.8% -3.7% -2.5% 
40%-60% 9.1% 12.1% -2.9% -1.1% 
60%-80% 18.4% 19.8% -1.5% -0.3% 
80%-90% 15.1% 14.9% +0.2% +0.1% 
90%-95% 11.1% 10.4% +0.8% +0.3% 
95%-99% 16.1% 14.0% +2.1% +0.7% 
99%-100% 24.8% 16.8% +7.9% +2.0% 
 
 The story told by these figures and statistics is in one sense clear and in another quite 
puzzling. It is clear that the federal tax system is much more progressive than state tax systems, 
and that shifting revenue-raising responsibility from the federal system to state systems would 
(holding all else equal) result in a significant regressive redistribution of wealth. What is less clear 
is: why do the same voters choose federal-level lawmakers who implement progressive taxes and 
state-level lawmakers who implement flat or regressive systems? Sections I.B and I.C take up that 
question. 
 
B.  Federal Progressivity, State Regressivity: Structural Explanations 
 
What accounts for the stark contrast between federal and state tax systems? One 
important factor is the sales tax at the state level (and the relative insignificance of sales taxes at 
the federal level). States derive about a third of their revenue, on average, from sales taxes,29 
while federal excises and customs duties account for less than 5% of federal tax revenues.30 Sales 
and excise taxes scale over consumption rather than income, and consumption is likely to be a 
larger share of income for families lower down the income ladder (who are likely to save less). 
Moreover, sales and excise taxes are generally flat (although a progressive consumption tax is 
certainly conceivable).31  
 
Yet the explanation in the previous paragraph is incomplete in two respects. First, four 
states (Delaware, Montana, Oregon, and New Hampshire) have no sales tax, and the tax systems 
of these states are still regressive relative to the federal system.32 Second, and more 
fundamentally, the sales tax explanation simply restates the question. The puzzle is why the 
federal tax system is so much more progressive than state tax systems. It is no answer to say that 
the federal tax system is more progressive because the federal government relies on progressive 
taxes. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See Inst. on Taxation & Econ. Policy, supra note 26, at 1. 
30 See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, supra note 28. 
31 See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1575 
(1979). 
32 Alaska has no state-level sales tax, but municipalities can (and many do) impose a retail-level tax. See 
Jeremy Bowman, The 5 States With No Sales Tax, The Motley Fool (Aug. 16, 2014), 
http://www.fool.com/personal-finance/taxes/2014/08/16/the-5-states-with-no-sales-tax.aspx. 
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 A potentially more persuasive explanation for the contrast between federal and state tax 
systems is that the marginal cost of redistribution is higher at the state level than at the federal 
level. This proposition is a “classical theoretical result” of the literature on fiscal federalism33—
and an intuitive one at that. In a nutshell: States that redistribute from the rich to the poor will 
see their richer residents migrate elsewhere and poorer residents from other states flood in. The 
outflow of wealthy individuals will mean that states with highly progressive tax systems will see 
their tax bases shrink. The inflow of low-income individuals will mean that states with generous 
redistributive policies will see the costs of social welfare programs rise.34 Economists Martin 
Feldstein and Marian Vaillant Wrobel offer perhaps the strongest version of the theory: they 
assert that “[s]tates and other local governments cannot redistribute income if individuals can 
migrate among political jurisdictions.”35 
 
 Of course, the same concern about redistribution resulting in the outmigration of high-
income individuals and the inflow of low-income individuals applies to national-level 
redistribution as well, as the concern about Facebook co-founder Eduardo Saverin’s renunciation 
of his U.S. citizenship in 2012 serves to illustrate.36 But for an individual or for a firm, it is almost 
always easier to move across state lines in response to redistributive tax policies than to move 
across national boundaries. And so we might expect that cost of redistribution—both in terms of 
the negative effect on the tax base from an outflow of high-income taxpayers and in terms of the 
increased burden on social welfare programs due to an inflow of low-income individuals—will be 
higher when redistribution is pursued at a lower level of government. 
 
 This argument gets us part of the way toward understanding the puzzling contrast 
between federal and state tax systems—but not all the way. The classical theoretical result of the 
fiscal federalism literature—that taxpayer mobility restricts the redistributive capacity of state and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 John R. Brooks II, Fiscal Federalism as Risk-Sharing: The Insurance Role of Redistributive Taxation, 
68 Tax L. Rev. 89, 111 (2014). 
34 The fiscal federalism literature on the relative costs of national-level and subnational-level redistribution 
is extensive. For an overview, see Brooks, supra note 33, at 89 & n.1; and Kirk J. Stark, Fiscal Federalism 
and Tax Progressivity: Should the Federal Income Tax Encourage State and Local Redistribution, 51 
UCLA L. Rev. 1389, 1408 & nn.71-73 (2004). 
35 Martin Feldstein & Marian Vaillant Wrobel, Can State Taxes Redistribute Income, 68 J. Pol. Econ. 
369, 370 (1998). This is not to say that state and local governments never try to redistribute income. But 
according to Feldstein and Wrobel: 
 
Although state tax structures may appear to be redistributive, real pretax wages must adjust in the 
long run to make each individual’s after-tax real income (or, more precisely, utility level) the same 
in all jurisdictions. If the after-tax real income available to an individual were higher in one state 
than in another, individuals would locate in states where real net incomes were more favorable. In 
response to differences in the progressivity of tax rates, migration would raise pretax real incomes 
of high income individuals in states where such individuals were taxed more heavily and lower 
pretax incomes of lower income individuals in such states. In equilibrium, the real after tax 
incomes would be independent of the state tax structure. 
 
Id. 
36 See Laura Sanders, So How Much Did He Save?, Wall St. J., May 18, 2012, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303360504577410571011995562.  
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local governments—garners surprisingly weak empirical support. A comprehensive review of the 
econometric literature on the wage and migration effects of state-level taxation lies beyond the 
scope of this essay, but two studies in particular merit mention. The first, by Andrew Leigh, 
examines taxes, wages, and migration across U.S. states between 1977 and 2002. Leigh finds that 
“more redistributive state taxes do not appear to have a substantial impact on the composition or 
volume of interstate migration.”37 More recently, Cristobal Young and collaborators find that 
“millionaire migration is indeed responsive to top [state] income tax rates,” but “the magnitude 
of the migration response is small and has little effect on the millionaire tax base.”38 Young and 
his coauthors also find that the optimal state tax rate on millionaires from a revenue-
maximization perspective is far above the actual rate in any state,39 suggesting that the constraint 
imposed by millionaire migration cannot completely explain the relative regressivity of state tax 
systems.40 
	  
Importantly, the tax changes that Leigh and Young et al. observe are not applied at 
random: states self-select into taxation of the rich. The states that do so may be the ones that 
expect high-income households to stay, and the states that did not adopt millionaire taxes may 
have had a different experience if they did. For example, California might have known that 
adopting a millionaire tax in 2005 would not lead the studios in Hollywood to pack up or the 
high-tech companies in Silicon Valley to flee, whereas a state such as Maryland might have been 
more worried that a millionaire tax would cause high-income households to cross the border to 
Virginia. The fact that relatively few millionaires left California after its 2005 tax increase does 
not mean that relatively few millionaires would have left Maryland if the same tax had been 
applied there. 
 
An analogy to the private market serves to illustrate. Imagine that we are trying to 
determine whether price increases affect demand for meals served at restaurants. Imagine, 
moreover, that we observe that restaurants do not experience a drop in sales volume after 
adjusting their prices upward. Would these findings suggest that the normal laws of supply and 
demand do not apply to restaurants? Not necessarily. It could be that restaurants raise their 
prices after receiving a Michelin star41: sales might go up because of the Michelin star, 
notwithstanding the price increase, but a comparable price increase might well have led to lower 
demand at a restaurant that did not receive the Michelin star. Analogously, California might 
raise its taxes (i.e., its prices) when “demand for California” rises (e.g., because of tech sector 
growth). And yet we should not infer that the laws of supply and demand do not apply to states 
just as they do to restaurants.42  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Andrew Leigh, Do Redistributive State Taxes Reduce Inequality?, 61 Nat’l Tax J. 81, 100 (2008). 
38 Cristobal Young et al., Millionaire Migration and Taxation of the Elite: Evidence from Administrative 
Data, 81 Am. Sociological Rev. 421, 423 (2016). 
39 Id. at 434.  
40 Young et al. explain these findings by positing that “[e]lites are embedded in the regions where they 
achieve success,” and so “have limited interest in moving to procure tax advantages.” Id. at 423. 
41 On Michelin stars and restaurant prices, see Oliver Gergaud, Karl Storchmann, and Vincenzo Verardi, 
Expert Opinion and Quality Perception of Consumers: Evidence from New York City Restaurants, 53 
Econ. Inq. 812 (2015). 
42 Mobility effects can constrain state-level redistribution even if individuals do not move across state lines. 
The possibility that high-income workers will leave high-tax states may lead to an adjustment in wage 
rates: high-tax states must pay more to prevent high-income workers from exiting. Likewise, the possibility 
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Recall also that cross-state mobility limits the efficacy of state-level redistribution not just 
because the rich potentially will leave high-tax states, but also because the poor potentially will 
move to states with more progressive tax-and-transfer systems. Here, the empirical support for 
the predictions of fiscal federalism theory appears to be stronger: lower-income households are 
indeed more likely to move to states with more generous welfare benefits.43 Yet as above, 
endogeneity problems plague almost any effort to assess the magnitude of the mobility responses 
to a further increase in state-level redistribution. States may adopt more progressive tax systems 
when they have reason to believe that low-income households are less likely to move in (e.g., 
because of high real estate prices or limited employment opportunities for low-wage workers). 
 
To sum up so far: we have strong theoretical reasons to believe that cross-state mobility 
limits the efficacy of state-level redistribution. By contrast, cross-country mobility is much more 
limited, and so we might expect national-level redistribution to be more effective. This helps to 
explain why we see greater tax progressivity at the federal level than at the state level. The 
structural explanation might be more persuasive if it enjoyed more robust empirical support, but 
the relative paucity of empirical evidence can be explained in part by the endogeneity problems 
described in the previous paragraphs. 
 
C.  Federal Progressivity, State Regressivity: Institutional Explanations 
 
 Institutional factors shed further light on the difference between federal and state 
taxation. Seven states—Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington and 
Wyoming—have no income tax at all, and in most of those states the state constitution explicitly 
or effectively prohibits income taxation.44 The constitutions of New Hampshire and Tennessee 
prohibit the taxation of earned income (though not dividends and interest).45 The constitutions of 
five other states—Colorado, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Pennsylvania—require that 
any income tax be at a flat rate,46 while the constitution of Georgia imposes a 6% cap on the 
individual income tax rate.47 Sixteen states (including six of those previously mentioned) require 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that lower-income workers will flock to states with generous redistributive schemes may lead to a wage 
rate adjustment in the opposite direction: firms in states with generous redistributive programs may pay 
low-skilled workers less than firms in states with less generous programs pay to low-skilled workers. See 
Feldstein & Wrobel, supra note 35, at 370. A rise in wage inequality could thus undo the redistributive 
effects of state tax changes even if everyone remains in place. Note, though, that Leigh finds “little 
evidence that—in the aggregate—more redistributive state taxes lead to a more unequal distribution of 
pre-tax hourly wages.” Leigh, supra note 37, at 100. 
43 See, e.g., Paul E. Peterson & Mark Rom, American Federalism, Welfare Policy, and Residential 
Choices, 83 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 711 (1989). 
44 See Timothy D. Hogan, Arizona’s Income Taxes: A Comparison with Other States and a Policy 
Discussion of Potential Tax Reforms—A Report from the Office of the University Economist 1 (July 
2016), https://wpcarey.asu.edu/sites/default/files/incometax07-16.pdf. 
45 See Marcus Hurn, State Constitutional Limits on New Hampshire’s Taxing Power: Historical 
Development and Modern State, 3 Pierce L. Rev. 251 (2008). 
46 See Personal Income Tax Systems in the United States: Presentation to the Joint Task Force on Income 
Tax Reform, Arizona State Legislature (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.azleg.gov/jlbc/jtfitr-090413.pdf.  
47 See Liz Farmer, Georgia Becomes First State To Cap Income Taxes, Governing (Nov. 4, 2014), 
http://www.governing.com/topics/elections/gov-georgia-caps-income-tax-rate.html. 
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legislative supermajorities for some or all tax increases.48 All in all, half of all states either have no 
general income tax, have a flat-tax requirement or rate cap, or have a legislative supermajority 
requirement that applies to income tax increases.49 
 
Figure 4. Institutional Constraints on State-Level Progressivity	  
 
 
The institutional explanation for the relative regressivity of state taxes is still not fully 
satisfying, for two reasons. First, it remains the case that half of all states do have an income tax, 
do not have a flat-tax requirement or a rate cap, and do not have legislative supermajority 
requirements for tax increases. And yet even the most progressive states among the remaining 
half of states have relatively flat tax systems. Second, the observation that half of the states face 
institutional barriers to progressive taxation does not explain why those institutional barriers exist 
in the first place.  
 
 Arguably, the institutional explanation for state-level regressivity is simply a feature of the 
structural story: constitutional limits on progressive income taxation function as a commitment 
device so that states can persuade high-income households to move in and dissuade low-income 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 In Arkansas and Oklahoma, a three-fourths vote of the legislature is required for a tax increase 
(Arkansas allows an exception for increases to sales and alcohol taxes).  A two-thirds requirement applies 
in Arizona, California, Colorado, Louisiana, Missouri, Nevada, South Dakota, and Washington. A three-
fifths vote is required in Delaware, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Oregon. A three-fourths requirement 
applies to property tax increases in Michigan. A three-fifths requirement applies to corporate income tax 
increases in Florida. See Tax Policy Ctr., States with Legislative Supermajority Requirements To Increase 
Taxes, 2010 (Apr. 5, 2013), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/taxfacts/content/PDF/state_supermajority.p
df. 
49 Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. 
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households from doing the same. In any event, these institutional variables give us further reason 
to expect that state tax systems will retain their regressive structure for the time being. To be 
sure, supermajority thresholds are not insuperable, and states can change their constitutions to 
eliminate income tax bans, caps, or flat-rate requirements. Yet the assertion here is not that state-
level regressivity is a permanent feature of fiscal federalism; the more modest assertion is that 
state tax systems will remain relatively regressive for the foreseeable future.  
 
II.  Federalism Doctrines and the Allocation of Entitlements 
 
At this point, the essay shifts from public finance to constitutional law—and, in particular, 
to three constitutional law doctrines that set the stage for the argument in Part III: the anti-
commandeering doctrine, the anti-coercion doctrine, and the state sovereign immunity doctrine. 
The following sections provide background on these doctrines. 
 
A.  The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine 
 
 The landmark decisions laying out the anti-commandeering rule are New York v. United 
States and Printz v. United States. This section provides a brief overview of both decisions and the 
doctrine for which they have come to stand. 
 
 1. New York v. United States 
 
 The factual background of New York v. United States is, in Justice O’Connor’s words, 
“intricate.”50 For the purposes of this discussion, the key fact is that the statute at issue—the Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act (LLRWPAA) of 198551—included a so-called 
“take title provision” requiring states to either (a) establish a waste disposal program consistent 
with congressional standards or (b) assume ownership over (and thus, liability for) waste 
generated in-state.52 Congress offered monetary incentives to states if they met certain statutory 
time targets for setting up their waste disposal arrangements, but it did not allow them to opt out 
of the LLRWPAA regime entirely.53 
  
Five years after LLRWPAA was passed, the State of New York challenged the validity of 
the Act on various constitutional grounds.54 The case took two more years to wind its way to the 
Supreme Court, where New York found a receptive audience. By a 6-3 margin, the Court 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 New York, 505 U.S. at 151. 
51 Pub. L. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (codified  as amended at 42 U. S. C. § 2021b et seq.). 
52 Id. § 5(d)(2)(C), 99 Stat. at 1851 (“If a State . . . is unable to provide for the disposal of all [low-level 
radioactive] waste generated within such State . . . by January 1, 1996, each State in which such waste is 
generated, upon the request of the generator or owner of the waste, shall take title to the waste, be 
obligated to take possession of the waste, and shall be liable for all damages directly or indirectly incurred 
by such generator or owner as a consequence of the failure to the State to take possession of the waste as 
soon after January 1, 1996, as the generator or owner notifies the State that the waste is available for 
shipment.”). 
53 New York, 505 U.S. at 152-53. 
54 New York initially argued that the Act was “inconsistent with the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments to 
the Constitution, with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and with the Guarantee Clause of 
Article IV of the Constitution.” Id. at 154. 
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concluded: “Whether one views the take title provision as lying outside Congress’ enumerated 
powers, or as infringing upon the core of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, 
the provision is inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government established by the 
Constitution.”55 Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, elaborated: 
 
Because an instruction to state governments to take title to waste, standing alone, would 
be beyond the authority of Congress, and because a direct order to regulate, standing 
alone, would also be beyond the authority of Congress, it follows that Congress lacks the 
power to offer the States a choice between the two. . . . Either way, the Act commandeers 
the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a 
federal regulatory program . . . .56 
 
In Justice O’Connor’s (and the Court’s) view, congressional commandeering of state 
legislatures poses a threat to democratic processes. In situations “where the Federal Government 
directs the States to regulate,” voters may not know whether federal elected officials or state 
elected officials deserve the credit—or blame—for the policy.57 Justice O’Connor and her 
colleagues feared that commandeering would allow members of Congress and their state 
counterparts to pass the hot potato of political accountability back and forth, leaving voters 
uncertain as to which officials are responsible.58 
 
My focus here is not at all on Justice O’Connor’s reasoning, but rather on the 
consequences of the rule she sets forth. As Roderick Hills puts it, “New York provides a particular 
kind of entitlement to state governments that is protected by a property rule.”59 That is, it gives 
states a property right in their own legislative processes.60 At the same time, the New York rule 
does not prevent Congress from purchasing legislation from states in an “intergovernmental 
marketplace.”61 The constitutional infirmity in LLRWPAA lay in the fact that Congress had 
seized this entitlement from the states rather than acquiring it through voluntary exchange. 
 
 2.  Printz v. United States   
 
The story of Printz begins with the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act in 1993,62 
which established a new system of background checks for potential purchasers of firearms.63 It 
required gun dealers to collect statements (“Brady Forms”) from potential purchasers and to 
transmit the contents of those Brady Forms (including the potential purchaser’s name, address, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Id. at 177. 
56 Id. at 176 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
57 Id. at 168-69. 
58 Id. at 168-69. 
59 Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes 
Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 813, 822 (1998). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 819. 
62 Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-22 (2006)). 
63 Arguably, the story begins much earlier—in March 1981, when White House Press Secretary James 
Brady was shot in the head by John Hinckley, Jr. After his near-death experience, Brady became a leading 
figure in the gun control, and when Congress ultimately enacted comprehensive federal gun-control 
legislation, it honored his efforts by titling the statute in his name. 
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and date of birth) to the chief law enforcement officer (CLEO) of the potential purchaser’s home 
jurisdiction. The Act also required the CLEO to make a “reasonable effort” to determine—
within five business days—whether the potential purchaser was a convicted felon, an illegal alien, 
or otherwise prohibited from acquiring a firearm. If the background check came out clean, the 
CLEO had to destroy records of the Brady Form and the transaction.64 CLEOs would only be 
exempt from these requirements if their states instituted instant background-check systems.65 
  
Shortly after the Brady Act took effect, Jay Printz, the sheriff (and thus the CLEO) of 
Ravalli County, Montana, brought a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the background-
check system.66 Printz “object[ed] to being pressed into federal service, and contend[ed] that 
congressional action compelling state officers to execute federal laws is unconstitutional.”67 Five 
Justices agreed. While New York held that Congress cannot “commandeer[] the legislative 
processes of the States,”68 Printz made clear that the same anti-commandeering rule applied to 
state administrative resources.69 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, concluded that “[t]he 
Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular 
problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer 
or enforce a federal regulatory program.”70	  
 
 Importantly, Printz still allows state executive officials to be contracted into the service of 
Congress. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Printz makes it quite clear that “Congress is . . . free 
to amend the [background check] program to provide for its continuance on a contractual basis 
with the States if it wishes, as it does with a number of other federal programs.”71 Again, the 
constitutional infirmity lay in the fact that Congress had taken this entitlement from the states 
rather than buying it. 
  
B.  The Anti-Coercion Rule 
 
 Since New York and Printz, the Supreme Court has not struck down another federal statute 
on anti-commandeering grounds (perhaps because the New York/Printz rule is clear enough that 
Congress knows not to violate it). The Roberts Court’s 2012 decision in National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius,72 however, breathes new life into a related doctrine that serves to 
supplement the anti-commandeering rule. The facts will be familiar to most readers, and so I will 
not belabor them here. In brief: The Affordable Care Act of 2010 required states receiving 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902-04 (1997). 
65 Id. at 903. An individual purchaser would be exempt if she or he “possesse[d] a state handgun permit 
issued after a background check,” id. at 903, but unless every potential purchaser who was a resident of a 
jurisdiction possessed a state permit, the CLEO would still have to comply with Brady Act requirements 
in some circumstances.  
66 Id. at 904 (citing Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994)). His case was consolidated 
with another action brought by the CLEO of Graham County, Arizona. See id. (citing Mack v. United 
States, 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994)). 
67 Id. at 905. 
68 New York, 505 U.S. at 176 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
69 Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. 
70 Id. 
71 Printz, 521 U.S. at 936. 
72 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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Medicaid funding (which is to say, every state) to expand eligibility to all citizens whose family 
income is up to 133% of the federal poverty line.73 This was, of course, in addition to the much 
more prominent and also-litigated “individual mandate” requiring most Americans to maintain a 
minimum level of health insurance. The federal government would pay all of the costs of 
covering newly eligible individuals through 2016 and at least 90% thereafter.74 Twenty-six states 
challenged the individual mandate as well as the Medicaid expansion requirement. By a 5-4 vote 
the Court upheld the individual mandate as an exercise of Congress’s taxing power, but by a 7-2 
vote, it struck down the Medicaid expansion requirement. As Chief Justice Roberts wrote, the 
Affordable Care Act put “a gun to the head” of state governments: expand Medicaid to new 
groups or else lose all federal Medicaid funding (which for most states would mean more than 
10% of their budget).75 According to Chief Justice Reports, the Affordable Care Act thus crossed 
the line from “financial inducement” to unconstitutional “coercion.”76  
 
 The NFIB decision leaves the outer contours of this anti-coercion doctrine unclear 
(indeed, intentionally so).77 It is thus too early to say for sure how the anti-coercion doctrine 
interacts with the property rule established by New York and Printz, but one way to frame it might 
be as follows: The anti-commandeering doctrine vests states with control over their legislative 
processes and administrative capabilities, although it allows the states to transfer their entitlement 
to Congress in a voluntary exchange. And the anti-coercion rule ensures that once Congress and 
the states enter into such an exchange, Congress cannot use its leverage to radically change the 
terms. In this way, the anti-coercion rule serves as something like a public law analogue to the 
private law doctrines of duress and unconscionability. 
 
C.  State Sovereign Immunity 
 
 The third doctrine under focus here is the state sovereign immunity doctrine. In 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., a four-Justice plurality held that Congress can abrogate the sovereign 
immunity of states pursuant to its power under the Constitution’s Commerce Clause.78 In short 
order, the Supreme Court overruled that holding. In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida79 and then 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII). 
74 Id. § 1396d(y)(1). 
75 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604. 
76 Id. at 2604-05 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
77 In the Chief Justice’s words: 
 
The Court in Steward Machine [Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937)] did not attempt to fix the 
outermost line where persuasion gives way to coercion. The Court found it enough for present 
purposes that wherever the line may be, this statute is within it. We have no need to fix a line 
either. It is enough for today that wherever that line may be, this statute is surely beyond it. 
Congress may not simply conscript state agencies into the national bureaucratic army, and that is 
what it is attempting to do with the Medicaid expansion. 
 
Id. at 2606-07 (alterations, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). 
78 See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 15 (1989) (plurality op.) (“Congress has the power to 
abrogate immunity when exercising its plenary authority to regulate interstate commerce.”). 
79 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
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in Alden v. Maine,80 the Court established that Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to 
abrogate states’ immunity from suit—either in federal court or in their own courts. This section 
summarizes those cases and explains the allocation of entitlements following from those decisions. 
 
1. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida 
 
In 1988, Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, which provided that 
Indian tribes can conduct specified gaming activities only pursuant to a compact with the state in 
which the activities occur.81 The Act also required states to negotiate with tribes “in good faith” 
to enter into such a compact,82 and allowed tribes to sue states in federal court to compel states to 
comply with the good-faith negotiation mandate.83 In 1991, the Seminole Tribe of Florida sued 
the State of Florida and its governor, seeking to compel the state to negotiate a gaming compact 
in good faith.84 The case reached the Supreme Court and provided the Justices with an 
opportunity to reconsider—and potentially overrule—Union Gas.  
 
 A five-Justice majority seized that opportunity. As Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the 
Court, “Union Gas was wrongly decided and . . . should be, and now is, overruled.”85 He 
elaborated: “Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making authority over 
a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by 
private parties against unconsenting States.”86  
 
 Note the second-to-last word in the previous paragraph: Seminole Tribe held that Congress 
cannot abrogate the sovereign immunity of “unconsenting” states. It did not prohibit states from 
trading their sovereign immunity to the federal government as part of a voluntary exchange. In 
this respect, the state sovereign immunity doctrine resembles the anti-commandeering doctrine: it 
assigns the states an entitlement protected by a property rule, but not an inalienable entitlement. 
States still can sell that entitlement if Congress’s price is right. (Note as well that Seminole Tribe 
does not prevent Congress from abrogating state sovereign immunity pursuant to the 
Reconstruction Amendments.87 The holding in Seminole Tribe only prevents Congress from 
abrogating state sovereign immunity pursuant to its powers under Article I.88)  
 
2. Alden v. Maine 
 
Seminole Tribe “made it clear that Congress lacks power under Article I to abrogate the 
States’ sovereign immunity from suits commenced or prosecuted in the federal courts.”89 The 
holding rested on the Eleventh Amendment, which by its terms does not apply to suits in state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
81 102 Stat. 2475, __ (1988) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C)). 
82 Id. at __ (codified at § 2710(d)(3)(A)). 
83 Id. at __ (codified at § 2710(d)(7)). 
84 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 51. 
85 Id. at 66. 
86 Id. 72. 
87 Id. at 59 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976)). 
88 See id. at 73 (“Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal 
jurisdiction”). 
89 Alden, 527 U.S. at 712 (emphasis added). 
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courts.90 Alden v. Maine presented the Justices with an opportunity to decide whether Congress—
pursuant to its Commerce Clause power—can abrogate state sovereign immunity in state court. 
 
In Alden, a group of probation officers sued their employer, the State of Maine, in state 
court for violating the overtime pay provisions of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act. The 
same five-Justice majority from Seminole Tribe held that the probation officers could not proceed 
with their suit. As Justice Kennedy wrote for the slender majority: “In light of history, practice, 
precedent, and the structure of the Constitution, we hold that the States retain immunity from 
private suit in their own courts, an immunity beyond the congressional power to abrogate by 
Article I legislation.”91  
 
 Alden was not the Court’s last word on state sovereign immunity. In Central Virginia 
Community College v. Katz, the Court carved out an exception to the Seminole Tribe/Alden rule for 
cases involving the federal bankruptcy laws.92 So in the bankruptcy context as well as the 
Reconstruction Amendments, the power to decide whether states are immune from private 
citizen suits lies with Congress, not with the states. But outside those (relatively limited) contexts, 
states possess an entitlement to sovereign immunity that Congress cannot take away.  
 
III.  The Court, the Coase Theorem, and the Distribution of Wealth 
 
Part II explained that the anti-commandeering and state sovereign immunity doctrines 
vest the states with valuable entitlements: in the anti-commandeering case, an entitlement to 
control over their own legislative processes and administrative resources; in the sovereign 
immunity case, an entitlement to freedom from monetary liability in federal or state court. The 
anti-coercion rule then acts as something like an unconscionability or duress doctrine protecting 
states’ end of the bargain in intergovernmental exchanges. Yet beyond the (as yet ill-defined) 
limits on federal-state exchanges imposed by the anti-coercion doctrine, the states are generally 
free to sell their entitlements in the intergovernmental market. This part considers the 
distributional implications of federalism doctrines given the possibility of intergovernmental 
bargaining. Section III.A discusses the implications of these doctrines for the intergovernmental 
distribution of wealth. Section III.B provides a preliminary analysis of the relationship between 
intergovernmental and interpersonal wealth distribution, while also identifying a number of 
complications that will be explored at greater length in Part IV.  
 
A.  Fiscal Federalism Meets the Coase Theorem 
 
The analysis begins with a provocative essay written in the wake of Seminole Tribe by 
Daniel Farber. The essay is three pages in full, and the heart of the argument is as easily 
excerpted as summarized. Farber writes: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 See U.S. Const. amendment XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens 
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State”). Nor does the Eleventh Amendment by 
its terms apply to suits by citizens against their own states in federal court, although the Court extended 
the Eleventh Amendment to bar such suits long ago. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
91 Alden, 527 U.S. at 754. 
92 546 U.S. 356, 379 (2006). 
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The Coase Theorem simply states that, assuming that transaction costs don't prevent 
contracting around legal rules, the legal rules don't matter—or more precisely, that the 
parties will always bargain their way to an economically efficient outcome, regardless of 
the legal rule. Bargaining washes away legal rules, in other words. If the Eleventh 
Amendment immunity were inalienable, the Coase Theorem would not apply, since it 
would be impossible to bargain. But one of the few things that is really clear about the 
Eleventh Amendment is that it is subject to waiver: the Constitution does not 
paternalistically force states to retain their immunities against their wills. In addition, 
Congress seems to be free to offer incentives for waiver. . . . So bargaining is possible. It 
follows from the Coase Theorem that, if Congress wants to eliminate immunity more 
than the state wants to keep it, then it will be eliminated—regardless of whether the 
Constitution recognizes sovereign immunity or gives Congress the power to abrogate 
immunity. So, to a first approximation, the Eleventh Amendment doesn't matter.93 
 
In other words, the Coase theorem would lead us to believe that absent transaction costs, 
Congress will purchase entitlements from states where Congress assigns a higher value to the 
entitlements than the states do. Congress will pay the states to administer federal programs where 
the states can do so more efficiently than federal agencies can. So too, Congress will pay the 
states to waive their sovereign immunity when such waivers advance federal objectives more than 
they burden states.  
 
Some readers might pause at this point and ask whether the intergovernmental market is 
even plausibly Coasean. The fact that many of these intergovernmental deals are embodied in 
federal statutes no doubt introduces rigidities to the bargaining process, making it more difficult 
for Congress and the states to adjust prices and other contract terms. But this point ought not be 
overemphasized. Congress often offers different deals to different states implementing federal 
programs. For example, the federal government matches Massachusetts’s Medicaid expenditures 
dollar for dollar, but contributes $3.11 for every dollar that Mississippi spends on Medicaid.94 
Many other pieces of legislation contain different deals for different states: the unique role for 
California with respect to tailpipe pollution standards under the Clean Air Act is illustrative.95 
Among the most famous (or infamous) provisions of this sort is the “Cornhusker Kickback,” a 
commitment of additional Medicaid funds to Nebraska added to the Affordable Care Act in 
order to win the vote of that state’s senator, Ben Nelson. (While the Cornhusker Kickback did 
not make it into the ultimate law,96 a special Medicaid funding provision for Louisiana did.97) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Daniel A. Farber, The Coase Theorem and the Eleventh Amendment, 13 Const. Comment. 141, 142 
(1996) (footnotes and paragraph breaks omitted). 
94 81 Fed. Reg. 80,078, 80,079-80 (Nov. 15, 2016). On Medicaid matching, see generally Kirk J. Stark, 
Rich States, Poor States: Assessing the Design and Effect of a U.S. Fiscal Equalization Regime, 63 Tax L. 
Rev. 957, 991-94 (2010).  
95 See Robinson Meyer, The Coming Clean-Air War Between Trump and California, The Atlantic (Mar. 
6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/03/trump-california-clean-air-act-waiver-
climate-change/518649. 
96 See David Weigel, Does Antonin Scalia Know What’s in the Affordable Care Law?, Slate (Mar. 28, 
2012), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/weigel/2012/03/28/does_antonin_scalia_know_what_s_in_the_affordable
_care_law_.html. 
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And even after a bill becomes law, there are ample opportunities for state-specific deals executed 
through waiver provisions. For example, the Department of Education under President Obama 
reached waiver agreements with dozens of states receiving federal funding under the No Child 
Left Behind Act.98 Renegotiation of terms between the Department of Health and Human 
Services and the 50 states is very much a feature of Medicaid implementation as well.99  
  
 Importantly, Coasean analysis on its own does not give us a reason to favor one initial 
allocation of entitlements over the other. After all, the same logic would suggest that if the Court 
had allocated the relevant entitlements to Congress rather than the states, then the states would 
purchase the entitlements back from the federal government when the states assign a higher 
value to the entitlements that Congress does. If Congress commandeered the states to administer 
a particular program but the cost to a state of administering the program exceeded the cost to the 
federal government, then the state would purchase the services of the appropriate federal agency. 
And likewise, if Congress made the states liable to lawsuits of a particular sort but the cost of 
liability to a state exceeded the value that Congress ascribed to state liability, then the state would 
purchase immunity from the federal government. 
 
 One might doubt the premise that states would ever purchase services or immunity from 
Congress if the entitlement allocation were the opposite of what it is today. But perhaps that 
doubt is misplaced. Indeed, one might think of New York v. United States as exactly such a case of 
states buying entitlements from the federal government. Under the LLRWPAA, states either had 
to establish the capacity to dispose of low level radioactive waste generated within their borders 
by January 1, 1993 or else to forfeit certain funds to the Secretary of Energy.100 In effect, the 
LLRWPAA said to the states: “Administer or pay.” Moreover, the LLRWPAA decreed that 
states would be liable for all damages incurred by generators or owners of low level radioactive 
waste unless the state provided for the disposal of such waste by January 1, 1996.101 In other 
words, Congress abrogated the immunity of states from claims by waste generators/owners but 
then offered to sell that immunity back to the states in exchange for a particular form of 
consideration (here, the state taking over the disposal process). 
 
 Outside the LLRWPAA context, it is not unheard-of for states to purchase administrative 
services from federal agencies. During the October 2013 federal government shutdown, several 
states paid the U.S. Department of the Interior to continue to operate national parks and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 See Avik S.A. Roy, The New Louisiana Purchase: Obamacare's $4.3 Billion Boondoggle, The Atlantic 
(Mar. 6, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/03/the-new-louisiana-purchase-
obamacares-43-billion-boondoggle/254003. A similar state-specific provision, “the Buffalo Buyout,” 
appeared in the failed American Health Care Act that House Republicans sought to pass in early 2017. 
See Daniel Hemel, Is the Buffalo Buyout Constitutional?, Whatever Source Derived (Mar. 23, 2017), 
bit.ly/2oj0X7W. 
98 See David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 265, 280-81 
(2013). 
99 See Michael S. Greve, Our Polarized, Presidential Federalism, in Parchment Barriers: Political 
Polarization and the Limits of Constitutional Order (Zachary C. Courser, Eric A. Helland & Kenneth P. 
Miller, eds., forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 7). 
100 See New York, 505 U.S. at 152-53. 
101 See id. at 153-54. 
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monuments within those states.102 One might think of this as the states and the Department of 
the Interior engaging in a voluntary exchange where the value that the states ascribe to federal 
administration is greater than the cost to the relevant federal agency. A similar phenomenon 
emerges in the procurement context, with state and local governments effectively purchasing 
procurement services from the federal General Services Administration.103 
 
 In any event, the argument in the next section will not rest on the premise that if New York 
and Printz had gone the other way, states would pay the federal government not to commandeer 
state legislative and executive functions. Nor will the argument depend on the premise that if 
Seminole Tribe and Alden had gone the other way, states would purchase back their immunity 
entitlement from Congress under certain circumstances. Rather, the argument is that the 
Rehnquist Court’s initial assignment of entitlements to the states causes Congress to pay the 
states more than it would if the initial assignment of entitlements had turned out differently. 
States’ right of refusal allows them to extract more resources from Congress in intergovernmental 
bargaining. The Coase theorem serves to illustrate this, but the assumption of zero transaction 
costs and two-way tradeability embedded in the Coase theorem are not necessary components of 
the analysis. 
 
 Even on its own terms, however, Farber’s application of the Coase theorem to fiscal 
federalism misses an important element of the Coase theorem. Coase never said that the legal 
allocation of entitlements “doesn’t matter,” as Farber asserts. Rather, Coase acknowledges that 
the allocation of entitlements will affect “the distribution of income and wealth as between the 
cattle-raiser and the farmer.”104 Neil Siegel has noted this oversight in Farber’s analysis, and has 
done so quite succinctly. He illustrates the point with a straightforward example: 
 
Suppose that in enacting particular legislation, Congress would be willing to pay $10 
million to render the state of California susceptible to suit in federal court for its violations 
of that statute. Suppose further that California is opposed to being vulnerable to such 
suits, and would be willing to pay $5 million for a substantive immunity. The cost-benefit 
efficient solution in this case is for California to be susceptible to suit in federal court for 
violations of the statute, since the benefit to Congress of $10 million exceeds the cost to 
California of $5 million . . . .  Assuming no transaction costs, this outcome will be 
achieved regardless of the controlling constitutional law of state sovereign immunity . . . . 
Nevertheless, the distributive consequences associated with the alternative legal regimes 
under examination are far from irrelevant. Under Union Gas, Congress ends up with a 
benefit of $10 million and California incurs a cost of $5 million. Under Seminole, Congress 
obtains a net benefit of $2.5 million (a $10 million benefit from California’s waiver less 
the purchase price of $7.5 million), and California nets $ 2.5 million (receipt of a $7.5 
million payment less the $5 million cost of waiver). Thus, although the law does not 
matter from the aggregate standpoint of efficiency, it matters a whole lot to each of these 
competing sovereigns. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 See Howard Berkes, Some States Allowed To Reopen National Parks—And Foot the Bill, NPR (Oct. 
11, 2013), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/10/11/232090272/utah-allowed-to-re-open-
national-parks-and-foot-the-bill. 
103 See, e.g., 81 Fed. Reg. 36,425 (July 6, 2016). 
104 See Coase, supra note 17, at 5. 
	   25 
 
 If Siegel’s analysis is right, then we might expect to see an increase in federal-to-state 
transfers after decisions such as New York, Seminole Tribe, Printz, and Alden that allocate valuable 
entitlements to the states. And to some extent, we do. As a share of gross domestic product and as 
a share of federal outlays, federal-to-state transfers rose significantly over the course of the 1990s. 
Figure 5 so illustrates, with dotted lines marking the years in which New York, Seminole Tribe, Printz, 
and Alden were handed down (1992, 1996, 1997, and 1999). 
 
Figure 5. Federal-to-State Transfers as Percent of GDP and of Federal Outlays, 
1976—2016105 
 
 
 To be sure, the increase illustrated in Figure 5 cannot be attributed entirely to the 
Supreme Court. For one thing, the upward trend starts several years before New York (though as 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion in New York contends, several decisions over the course of the 1980s 
may have anticipated the New York holding).106  And second, the rise in federal-to-state transfers 
in the 1990s coincided with a number of other significant events, including the end of the Cold 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 The data for Figure 5 is drawn from Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Budget of the United States 
Government—Fiscal Year 2017, Historical Tables, tbl. 12.1 (2016). 
106 See New York, 505 U.S. at 161-62; cf. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 
264, 288 (1981) (indicating that a statute survives Tenth Amendment scrutiny where it does not 
“commandeer[] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a 
federal regulatory program”); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765 (1982) (statute survives scrutiny 
where it does not “directly compel[] the States to enact a legislative program” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 513 (1988) (noting that “the Tenth Amendment might 
set some limits on Congress' power to compel States to regulate on behalf of federal interests”). 
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War in 1991 and the Gingrich Revolution in 1994. Any claim that the Supreme Court was the 
sole cause of the rise in federal-to-state transfers in the 1990s would be subject to ridicule.  
 
 Moreover, even if federalism doctrines play some role in the rise of federal-to-state 
transfers in the 1990s, the fact remains that federal-to-state transfers were significant in size long 
before New York, Printz, Seminole Tribe, and Alden.107 This fact lends itself to a pair of possible 
interpretations. One is that New York and the follow-on cases are manifestations of a long-
understood norm in American political culture: Congress cannot tell the states what to do 
(though it may pay them to do what Congress wants).108 Another (not incompatible) view is that 
federalism norms in American political culture began to break down in the 1990s, and that the 
Rehnquist Court intervened to protect these principles long immanent in America’s (written or 
unwritten) fiscal constitution. 
 
 Whether the allocation of these valuable entitlements to states rather than the federal 
government started with New York or long before, we have strong theoretical and some empirical 
grounds for believing that this allocation of entitlements makes the states richer and the federal 
government poorer. But that is not, I will argue, the end of the matter. The next section turns to 
the interpersonal distributional consequences of these intergovernmental entitlement 
allocations—and, in particular, the ways in which these entitlement allocations differentially 
affect taxpayers of various incomes. 
 
B.  A Toy Model of Federal and State Taxing and Spending 
  
To recapitulate: The anti-commandeering and state sovereign immunity doctrines each 
assign to the states a valuable entitlement that the states can sell back to Congress on the 
intergovernmental market. If intergovernmental bargaining is Coasean, then the initial 
entitlement allocation will not determine whether the states ultimately enact and enforce federal 
programs or whether the states ultimately enjoy immunity from lawsuits in their own and federal 
courts: Congress will purchase the entitlement from the states if Congress assigns a higher value 
to the entitlement than states do. Yet even under Coasean conditions, the initial allocation of 
entitlements does have a distributive effect: it enriches the party to whom the entitlement is 
allocated. 
 
 A toy model will allow us to begin to explore the interpersonal distributive effects of the 
intergovernmental allocation of entitlements. Imagine that Congress’s entire budget is devoted to 
national defense, and that State’s entire budget is devoted to schools. Imagine, moreover, that 
society is composed of two groups: the Riches and the Rest. Consistent with breakdown between 
the top decile and the bottom nine deciles in Table 1, we will assume that the Riches (the top 
decile) bear 50% of the federal tax burden and 40% of the state tax burden, with the remainder 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 On the history of federal-to-state transfers, see John Joseph Wallis & Wallace E. Oates, The Impact of 
the New Deal on American Federalism, in The Great Depression and the American Economy in the 
Twentiety Century 155 (Michael E. Bordo et al. eds., 1998). 
108 See Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107 (1861) (“[T]he Federal Government, under the 
Constitution, has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to 
perform it.”). On the early history of the anticommandeering doctrine, see generally Wesley J. Campbell, 
Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 Yale L.J. 1104 (2013). 
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falling to the Rest. Let’s assume, moreover, that the federal government and the states each start 
out with budgets of $100. Thus, the Riches pay $50 of federal taxes and $40 of state taxes for a 
total of $90, while the Rest pay $50 of federal taxes and $60 of state taxes for a total of $110. The 
first column of Table 2 reflects the status quo. 
 
 Now imagine that members of Congress decide to create a new health care program 
(we’ll call it Medicaid). Assume, moreover, that New York and Printz have come out the other way: 
Congress has the power to commandeer state legislative processes and administrative resources 
pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Also assume that members of Congress would prefer, all else 
equal, not to raise federal taxes. Finally, assume that the states can administer Medicaid at a cost 
of $10, while it would cost some amount more than $10 for the federal government to do the 
same. 
 
 In our non-Printz world, we might expect Congress to commandeer the states and compel 
them to administer the Medicaid program. Moreover, and most importantly for our purposes, we 
might expect Congress to saddle states with the entire cost of Medicaid. The states will then have 
to find an additional $10 to pay for Medicaid. If they do so by raising taxes while maintaining 
their existing tax structure, then the result will be an additional $4 in taxes paid by the Rich and 
$6 in taxes paid by the Rest. The Rich now pay a total of $94 in federal and state taxes, and the 
Rest now pay a total of $116. The second column of Table 2 reflects this non-Printz scenario. 
 
 Now, imagine that the Supreme Court rules for the states in Printz. Instead of Congress 
foisting the cost of Medicaid onto the states, the states now have the entitlement to their own 
legislative processes and administrative resources, and so they can hold out until Congress makes 
an offer at least sweet enough to offset the cost of administering Medicaid. We will assume for the 
sake of simplicity that Congress captures all of the contractual surplus (i.e., the federal 
government pays an amount equal to the states’ cost of administering Medicaid, rather than an 
amount equal to the federal government’s higher cost of administering Medicaid). The federal 
government now has to raise an additional $10 in revenues, which it does by imposing an 
additional tax of $5 on the Rich and $5 on the Rest. The Rich now pay a total of $95 in federal 
plus state taxes, while the Rest pay a total of $115. The third column of Table 2 illustrates. 
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Table 2. Toy Model—All Adjustments on Tax Side  
 (1) 
Starting Position 
(2) 
Commandeering 
(3) 
Printz 
Federal    
Defense Spending $100 $100 $100 
Medicaid Spending — — $10 
Taxes $100 $100 $110 
Rich $50 $50 $55 
Rest $50 $50 $55 
State    
School Spending $100 $100 $100 
Medicaid Spending — $10 — 
Taxes $100 $110 $100 
Rich $40 $44 $40 
Rest $60 $66 $60 
Total Spending $200 $210 $210 
Total Taxes $200 $210 $210 
Rich $90 $94 $95 
Rest $110 $116 $115 
 
 In this initial version of the toy model, Printz results in a transfer of $1 from the Rich to 
the Rest. The cause of this transfer is easy to see: Printz leads to more revenue being raised 
through the more progressive federal tax system, and correspondingly less revenue being raised 
through the more regressive state tax systems. There are, however, several reasons to wonder 
whether reality will work out this neatly. For example, the shift in wealth from state to federal 
governments effected by Printz might lead the federal tax system to become less progressive or 
state systems to become more so. Moreover, the states might respond to a Medicaid mandate 
under Printz by cutting school spending rather than raising taxes; so too, the federal government 
might respond to the costs imposed by Printz through defense spending cuts. Also, transaction 
costs might stand in the way of federal-state exchanges, such that the consequence of Printz is less 
spending overall rather than more federal taxation and less state-level revenue-raising. 
Furthermore, the federal government and/or the states might export present-period costs to 
future generations through public debt. And finally, the possibilities limned here might not be 
mutually exclusive: we might see a bit of each in reality. The next part turns to the question of 
which—if any—of these outcomes might be most plausible.  
 
IV.  Complications and Qualifications 
 
 The last section laid out the basic intuition underlying the claim that federalism doctrines 
allocating valuable entitlements to states rather than the federal government generate progressive 
redistributive effects at the individual/household level. The goal of this part is to stress-test that 
claim: to question each of the underlying assumptions so as to determine just how robust the 
basic intuition is. Section IV.A considers the possibility that adjustments to the progressivity of 
federal and state tax systems will offset the interpersonal redistributive effects of a federal-to-state 
wealth shift. Section IV.B considers the potential for spending-side adjustments. Section IV.C 
addresses the potential for federalism doctrines to affect the overall size of government. Section 
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IV.D considers the possibility of borrowing by either federal or state governments, with potential 
implications for the distribution of income and wealth across generations. Section IV.E assesses 
the relevance of federalism doctrines given the political safeguards of federalism that (arguably) 
exist as a backdrop. 
 
A.  Adjustments to the Progressivity of Federal and State Tax Systems 
 
 The basic model illustrated in Table 2 assumed that in all scenarios, the Rich would pay 
50% of federal taxes and 40% of state taxes. The analysis in Sections I.A and I.B pointed toward 
reasons why it might be difficult for states to adjust the progressivity of their tax systems. Yet 
those structural and institutional constraints at the state level do not preclude the possibility of a 
federal-side adjustment. Imagine that Congress responds to the shift from a pro-commandeering 
rule to Printz still by raising $110 but now also adjusting the split of federal taxes so that the rich 
pay only 49.1% of federal taxes, or $54.0. The result would be that the Rich would pay the same 
amount in total taxes as before. This outcome would be consistent with what Lee Fennell and 
Richard McAdams refer to as the “distributive invariance hypothesis”: “that the same 
distributive result will be achieved regardless of how legal rules are configured or how 
entitlements to resources are assigned.”109  
 
Table 3.  Toy Model—Adjustments to Progressivity 
 (2) 
Commandeering 
(3) 
Printz 
(4) 
Printz Plus 
Adjustment 
Federal    
Defense Spending $100 $100 $100 
Medicaid Spending — $10 $10 
Taxes $100 $110 $110 
Rich $50 $55 $54 
Rest $50 $55 $56 
% of Taxes Paid by Rich 50% 50% 49.1% 
State    
School Spending $100 $100 $100 
Medicaid Spending $10 — — 
Taxes $110 $100 $100 
Rich $44 $40 $40 
Rest $66 $60 $60 
Total Spending $210 $210 $210 
Total Taxes $210 $210 $210 
Rich $94 $95 $94 
Rest $116 $115 $116 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics, 100 
Minn. L. Rev. 1051, 1055 (2016). 
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 Yet the distributive invariance hypothesis is not an iron law; indeed, as Fennell and 
McAdams argue, it holds rarely if ever.110 And there are strong reasons to believe that 
distributive invariance is violated here as well. This section considers two reasons why the 
invariance hypothesis might not hold and one reason why it might. The analysis is necessarily 
speculative and so the conclusions are necessarily tentative. The theme throughout is that 
distributive invariance is perhaps possible but far from inevitable in this context. 
 
1.  Different State Preferences for Progressivity. As an initial matter, we know 
that voters in different states have different distributive preferences111 and face different 
constraints on their ability to raise revenues via progressive taxation.112 We might expect, then, 
that if states bear more of the revenue-raising burden of federal taxation, some states will place 
more of that burden on the Rich and others will place more on the Rest. Imagine two types of 
states—Blue and Red—with preferences for progressive redistribution stronger in the former. 
Imagine, moreover, that the anti-commandeering doctrine is discarded and so Congress can 
export revenue-raising responsibilities to the states, each of which allocates that burden 
differently (with the Rest bearing a larger share of the burden in Red than in Blue). Any effort to 
offset state-level tax changes through a federal-level tax change would be overcompensatory in 
Blue and undercompensatory in Red. The result would be to introduce a horizontal inequity 
between low-income households in Blue (who now pay less than under the anti-commandeering 
status quo) and low-income households in Red (who now pay more).113 Note, moreover, that 
lower-income states tend to be redder (i.e., more conservative) ones as well.114 Millions of low-
income households would thus be left in states that allocate larger shares of the tax burden to the 
poor.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Id. at 1056. For a general critique of the invariance hypothesis across contexts, see id. at 1079-1109. 
111 See David Rueda & Daniel Stegmueller, Preferences That Matter: Inequality, Redistribution and 
Voting (Mar. 9, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~polf0050/RuedaStegmueller_PreferencesMatter.pdf. 
112 On the latter point, see text following note 39. 
113 We might perhaps imagine a federal intervention along the lines of the “progressive state tax credit” 
proposed by Eric Kades. See Eric Kades, Giving Credit Where Credit Is Due: Reducing Inequality with a 
Progressive State Tax Credit, 77 La. L. Rev. 359 (2016). The goal of such an intervention would be to 
provide greater relief to low-income households in states with more progressive tax systems. As Kades 
notes, an intervention along these lines would be vulnerable to an argument that it violates the 
Constitution’s Uniformity Clause, though Kades ultimately concludes that the Uniformity Clause 
concerns are nonfatal. See Kades, supra, at 408-14; cf. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“[A]ll duties, imposts 
and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States”). 
 How plausible is it that Congress will respond to a reversal of the anti-commandeering, anti-
coercion, and state sovereign immunity doctrines with an intervention along the lines contemplated by 
Kades? As emphasized in text, the result depends in part on the reasons why progressive taxation 
emerges. If federal-level progressivity is a direct response to voter preferences for redistribution, then 
Kades’s proposal might seem more plausible. If federal-level progressivity is a function of different 
marginal costs of raising revenue from different income groups, then we might expect a shift in revenue-
raising responsibilities to result in an interpersonal wealth shift as well.   
114 See Andrew Gelman et al., Rich State, Poor State, Red State, Blue State: What’s the Matter with 
Connecticut?, 2 Q. J. Pol. Sci. 345 (2007). 
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 2.  Different Marginal Costs of Taxation. The plausibility of the invariance 
hypothesis also depends on why we think federal-level progressivity and state-level regressivity 
emerge in the first place. When federal and state lawmakers raise revenue via taxation, they reap 
political benefits from additional spending and bear political costs from voters who feel the brunt 
of those taxes. As a first approximation, lawmakers support spending up to the point that the 
marginal political benefits of an additional $1 of spending equal the marginal political costs of an 
additional $1 of taxation. Meanwhile, on the tax side, lawmakers allocate revenue-raising 
burdens across income groups. We might expect that lawmakers will allocate burdens across the 
Rich and the Rest such that the marginal political cost of raising an additional $1 of revenue 
from each group is the same. (Otherwise, lawmakers could achieve political gains by tilting the 
tax system more toward the Rich or toward the Rest.) Ceteris paribus, we might expect—for 
reasons explored in Section I.B—that raising revenues from the Rich will be costlier for state 
lawmakers than for federal lawmakers. Thus we might expect that federal and state lawmakers 
will allocate tax burdens differently, as indeed they do. Since the marginal cost of taxing the Rich 
relative to the Rest is lower for federal than for state lawmakers, we might anticipate differences 
between federal and state systems to endure even when revenue-raising responsibilities are 
shifted. Indeed, we might be surprised to see otherwise: if the costs of taxing the rich at the state 
level are higher than at the federal level, then why would we ever expect the states to match the 
allocation of federal tax burdens across income groups? 
 
 3.  Counterargument: Lump-Sum Taxation and Redistribution 
Distinguished. The intuitions in the previous paragraphs are not invulnerable to 
counterargument. We might instead imagine a model along the following lines: The cost of 
public goods is $10 per household, and voters desire redistribution of $5 from each household in 
the Rich to the Rest. (For expositional ease, we will assume for present purposes that the number 
of households among the Rich and the Rest is the same.) We might imagine two ways in which 
revenue-raising and redistribution could occur: 
 
Scenario A. All revenue-raising and redistribution occurs through the federal system. 
The federal government imposes a tax of $15 on households in the Rich and $5 on 
households in households in the Rest. Each household is paying its pro rata share of the 
cost of public goods ($10), and the Rich are paying an extra $5 which is going to reduce 
the tax bill of the Rest by $5.  
 
Scenario B. All revenue-raising to pay for public goods occurs through the state systems, 
but redistribution occurs through the federal system. States impose a lump-sum tax of $10 
on each household, while the federal government imposes a tax of $5 on each household 
in the Rich and a tax of –$5 on each household in the Rest (i.e., a subsidy of $5). Each 
household is paying its pro rata share of public goods ($10), and the Rich are paying an 
extra $5 which is then transferred to the Rest. 
 
 Scenario A would be consistent with a world in which the Supreme Court disallows 
commandeering and congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity; Scenario B would be 
consistent with a world in which Congress is unconstrained by the anti-commandeering and state 
sovereign immunity doctrines. The only effect of federalism doctrines in these scenarios is to 
determine whether the lump-sum component of revenue-raising occurs at the federal level or the 
state level.   
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 Embedded in this argument is a strong assumption about redistributive politics: If 
members of Congress would impose a $15 tax on the Rich and a $5 tax on the Rest when 
revenue-raising responsibilities lie with the federal government, then members of Congress also 
would impose a $5 tax on the Rich and a -$5 tax on the Rest when revenue-raising 
responsibilities lie with the states. Put differently, the argument assumes away the magic of zero. 
By that, I mean that the argument assumes a political equivalence between reductions to tax and 
negative taxes. But the significance of zero can be discarded so easily. 
 
 To elaborate: Scenario A and Scenario B both involved redistribution of $5 from each 
household in the Rich to each household among the Rest. The difference was that in Scenario A, 
$5 was added to the federal tax bill of the Rich and subtracted from the tax bill of the Rest, while 
in Scenario B, only the Rich paid federal taxes and the Rest received what might be 
characterized as a “handout” of $5. As more revenue-raising occurs through the state systems, 
any effort to hold the total level of redistribution constant will require more such “handouts” 
from the federal government. If handouts to lower-income households elicit more backlash than 
tax breaks for lower-income households, then federalism doctrines that assign revenue-raising 
responsibilities to the states or the federal government will indeed affect the political costs of 
redistribution.  
 
 Research in the lab by Edward McCaffery and Jonathan Baron suggests that zero matters 
quite a lot—at least to voters. Across multiple studies, McCaffery and Baron find that “negative 
tax brackets in one tax to offset positive brackets in others . . . are salient and disfavored.”115 The 
details of their studies are quite complicated (and lie beyond the scope of this essay); moreover, 
the external validity of their laboratory findings is (of course) unclear. What we can say is this: 
evidence from the lab gives us reason to doubt that tax rates will adjust seamlessly to a shift in 
revenue-raising responsibilities across levels of government, especially where adjustment might 
entail a below-zero rate of federal taxation for some.  
 
B.  Adjustments to Federal and State Spending 
 
 A second possibility is that federal and state governments will respond to the reallocation 
of valuable entitlements by holding their tax systems constant and adjusting the amount of 
spending. Table 3 illustrates such an adjustment. Under commandeering, when the federal 
government imposes a cost of $10 on the states, states respond by reducing their spending on 
schools by $10, with no changes to their tax system. Under Printz, when that $10 cost is shifted to 
the federal government, Congress responds by cutting defense spending commensurately—again, 
with no tax system changes. On this view, the only effect of federalism doctrines is to determine 
the composition of government spending.  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Political Psychology of Redistribution, 52 UCLA L. 
Rev. 1745, 1768 (2005); see also id. at 1771-72. 
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Table 4. Toy Model—All Adjustments on Spending Side  
 (2) 
Commandeering 
(3) 
Printz 
Federal   
Defense Spending $100 $90 
Medicaid Spending — $10 
Taxes $100 $100 
Rich $50 $50 
Rest $50 $50 
State   
School Spending $90 $100 
Medicaid Spending $10 — 
Taxes $100 $100 
Rich $40 $40 
Rest $60 $60 
Total Spending $200 $200 
Total Taxes $200 $200 
Rich $90 $90 
Rest $110 $110 
 
 How plausible are the adjustments imagined in Table 4? If federal and state governments 
are responsive to voter desires, and if the federal and state governments already providing voters 
with the amount of defense and school spending that they desire, then the answer is: quite 
implausible. Why would we expect voter demand for national defense or school spending to 
depend on whether revenue-raising for Medicaid occurs through the state or federal system? On 
the other hand, if members of Congress incur a marginal political cost from each additional $1 of 
federal (but not state) taxation, and if the marginal political cost of taxation is increasing, then 
federalism doctrines may indeed affect the quantity of federal and state spending: under Printz, 
each $1 of spending is more costly to Congress and less so for state lawmakers. In that event, the 
distributional consequences of federalism doctrines will depend in part on whether a shift in 
spending from the federal government to the states redounds to the benefit of the rich or the 
poor. 
 
 We do know that federal and state governments spend their dollars in very different ways. 
Figure 6 shows the percentage of federal and state outlays by area for fiscal year 2016. Several 
similarities as well as dramatic differences spring forward. Federal and state governments both 
spend heavily on health care, with Medicare a larger share of the federal budget and Medicaid a 
larger share of state budgets. Social Security and national defense are federal-only items; 
elementary, secondary, and higher education compose a much larger share of state budgets. 
These generalities will not be hugely surprising to most readers. 
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Figure 6.  Federal and State Outlays by Area, Fiscal Year 2016116 
 
If federal and state governments respond to entitlement reallocations by adjusting their 
levels of spending, what would that mean for the distribution of income and wealth across 
individuals? This is a maddeningly complex question with no easy answer. Would the federal 
government spend more on national defense if not for Printz? And if so, who benefits from 
defense spending? (The answer—to be glib—depends on whether the invaders want just to loot 
us or to enslave us.) Insofar as federalism doctrines make the states richer, do the states spend 
more money on schools?  And if so, who benefits from that?117  
  
One common approach is to treat all spending as lump-sum redistribution allocated on a 
per-capita basis;118 on this view, shifts from federal to state spending would have no effect on 
interpersonal distribution beyond the effects from corresponding tax-burden shifts. An alternative 
approach would be to try to determine who benefits from federal spending and who benefits 
from state spending; and yet such an exercise—fraught in its own right—tells us very little about 
who benefits from the marginal dollar of federal/state spending.119 I will not seek to resolve that 
question here, except to note that spending-side changes potentially magnify and potentially 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 The data for Figure 6 are drawn from Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 105, tbl. 3.2, and from 
Nat’l Ass’n of State Budget Officers, State Expenditure Report: Examining Fiscal 2014-2016 State 
Spending 10-11 tbl. 3 (2016). 
117 Edward Wolff and Ajit Zacharias find that education spending benefits lower-income households much 
more—in percentage-of-income terms—than higher-income households. See Edward N. Wolff & Ajit 
Zacharias, The Distributional Consequences of Government Spending and Taxation in the U.S., 1989 
and 2000, 53 Rev. Income & Wealth 692, 711 (2007). 
118 See, e.g., Allan H. Meltzer & Scott F. Richard, A Rational Theory of the Size of Government, 89 J. 
Pol. Econ. 914, 917 (1981); Jason S. Oh, Are the Rich Responsible for Progressive Tax Rates? 
(unpublished manuscript). 
119 See, e.g., Gerald Prante & Andrew Chamberlain, Tax Found., Who Pays Taxes and Who Receives 
Government Spending? An Analysis of Federal, State and Local Tax and Spending Distributions, 1991-
2004 (2014), https://tax.network/gprante/who-pays-taxes-and-who-receives-government-spending-an-
analysis-of-federal-state-and-local-tax-and-spending-distributions-1991-2004. 
0%	   5%	   10%	   15%	   20%	   25%	   30%	   35%	  
Transportation	  
Corrections	  
Public	  Assistance/Income	  Security	  
National	  Defense	  
Medicare	  
Higher	  Education	  
Elementary	  and	  Secondary	  Education	  
Social	  Security	  
Medicaid	  
State	   Federal	  
	   35 
moderate the redistributive effects of federalism doctrines. If the marginal $1 of state spending is 
more likely than the marginal $1 of federal spending to flow to the Rest rather than the Rich, 
then spending-side adjustments magnify the distributional consequences of state-to-federal tax 
burden shifts. If the opposite, then spending-side adjustments offset some of the distributional 
effects of federalism-induced tax changes. 
 
C.  Effects on the Overall Size of Government   
 
So far, the analysis in this essay has proceeded on the assumption that bargaining 
between Congress and the states is Coasean (i.e., that transaction costs are zero). That 
assumption is obviously counterfactual (or, at the very least, implausible). Insofar as the transfer 
of entitlements requires legislation at either level, drafting costs and logrolling may get in the way 
of mutually beneficial exchanges. And even if state and federal agencies can negotiate the 
necessary transfer, such exchanges will inevitably involve transaction costs as well: no complex 
organization operates friction-free, and certainly not a state or federal bureaucracy. 
 
Transaction costs may alter the analysis above in two ways. First, in a world with positive 
transaction costs, federalism doctrines that allocate valuable entitlements to the states rather than 
the federal government may discourage Congress from pursuing new programs. Imagine, as 
above, that the states can implement Medicaid at a cost of $10, but now add three more elements 
to the hypothetical: (1) members of Congress assign a value of $11 to the Medicaid program; (2) it 
would cost $12 for the federal government to implement the program on its own; and (3) 
Congress and the states will incur transaction costs of $2 if Congress tries to purchase the states’ 
services. These transaction costs may take a number of forms, including—as in the case of the 
ACA’s Medicaid expansion—political costs and/or personal disutility incurred by governors who 
simply do not want to strike a deal with an administration they oppose.120 
 
Under these assumptions, the program will be implemented if commandeering is allowed 
but not if Printz is the law of the land. If Congress can compel the states to administer the 
program, Congress will do so—and the states will not “counter-commandeer” by paying the 
federal government to lay off (costs to the states of $10 < benefit to Congress of $11). But if $2 of 
costs are incurred in the transactional process, then no deal will occur (costs to the states $10 + 
transaction costs of $2 > benefit to Congress of $11). And Congress will not implement the 
program through the federal bureaucracy because the cost of doing so is higher than the benefit 
that members perceive ($12 cost of federal implementation > benefit to Congress of $11). 
 
We therefore might expect the anti-commandeering doctrine to affect which programs 
get implemented as well as who pays. And likewise, we might expect the state sovereign 
immunity doctrine to affect when states waive their immunity as well as whether they are 
compensated for the cost. But we might also expect federalism doctrines to affect the size of 
government in the opposite direction—assuming, again, positive transaction costs. Put yourself in 
the position of a governor or state lawmaker in a world in which New York, Printz, Seminole Tribe, 
and Alden all went the other way. You are deciding whether to invest resources in building up a 
state bureaucracy. You know, however, that at any point Congress can swoop in and either 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 See Kimberly Leonard, Opposing Medicaid Expansion, U.S. News & World Report, Dec. 4, 2015, 
https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2015/12/04/opposing-medicaid-expansion. 
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commandeer your bureaucracy for its own ends or subject you to liability with respect to your 
activities. Might this knowledge influence your decision whether or not to proceed? 
 
This latter argument aligns with the conventional economic wisdom supporting the just 
compensation requirement for government takings of private property. The intuition there is that 
if individuals and firms fear the government seizing their property without compensation at any 
moment, they will refrain from investing capital in productive enterprises.121  The just 
compensation requirement serves to encourage individuals and firms to make capital outlays 
notwithstanding the risk of a taking. So too, the anti-commandeering and state sovereign 
immunity doctrines encourage states to invest in their own governments.122 
 
The analogy is admittedly imperfect. An entitlement is protected by a “liability rule” 
when “someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively 
determined value for it,” even if the original entitlement holder refuses to sell for that price.123 An 
entitlement is protected by a “property rule” when “someone who wishes to remove the 
entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of 
the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller.”124 The just compensation requirement operates as a 
liability rule. By contrast, the anti-commandeering and state sovereign immunity doctrines 
operate as property rules.125 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 For an overview and analysis of the law and economics literature on just compensation, see William A. 
Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of 
“Just Compensation” Law, 17 J. Legal Stud. 269 (1988). 
122 For this reason, Congress might have an incentive to pre-commit to an anti-commandeering rule even 
if the Court did not force it to. The logic for doing so would be the same logic that would lead a 
government to bind itself to a just compensation requirement in the takings context: Given a choice 
between (a) being able to commandeer state administrative capabilities and (b) having to pay for the states’ 
services, Congress would prefer (a). But given a choice between (b) having to pay for the states’ services 
and (c) not being able to procure state services at any price, Congress would choose (b). If commandeering 
is unfettered, then states will be reluctant to build up their own administrative capabilities, leaving 
Congress in the land of option (c). And so Congress is better off it can credibly commit not to commandeer 
the states. 
 The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48, might be 
interpreted as a pre-commitment mechanism of this sort. Under the 1995 Act, House and Senate 
members may raise a point of order against a direct mandate in legislation that imposes a cost exceeding 
$50 million on state or local governments. See Robert Jay Dilger & Richard S. Beth, Cong. Research 
Serv., CRS 7-5700 Unfunded Mandates Reform Act: History, Impact, and Issues 3-4 (2013). But points 
of order under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act can be waived by majority vote, and the Act does not 
apply to potentially coercive conditions in grant-in-aid programs. See id. at 9, 18. The Act has thus 
proven not to be a self-imposed straitjacket, but instead a relatively loose constraint on Congress’s ability 
to externalize costs downward to states and localities. See Theresa Gullo, History and Evolution of the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 57 Nat’l Tax J. 559 (2004). 
123 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1092 (1972). 
124 Id. 
125 The anti-coercion doctrine arguably operates as an inalienability rule layered on top of the property 
rules established by the anti-commandeering and state sovereign immunity doctrines. I say “arguably” 
because insofar as the anti-coercion doctrine serves as a public law analogue to the private law doctrines 
of duress and unconscionability, then one might describe the anti-coercion doctrine as defining consent 
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One can imagine a liability rule in this context taking the following form: States have an 
entitlement to their own legislative and executive processes, and to immunity from suit by private 
citizens in state and federal court. Congress cannot take that entitlement away from states 
without paying. But Congress can exercise a power of eminent domain over the states and seize 
the relevant entitlement for itself, provided that it pays just compensation. And if state and 
federal officials cannot settle the matter themselves, courts will adjudicate the question of how 
much compensation is just.126 On this view, the federal government could have required states to 
expand Medicaid to all citizens with incomes up to 133% of the poverty line, and could have 
required states to establish health insurance exchanges under the Affordable Care Act. If a state 
failed to reach an agreement with the federal government regarding funding, then the state 
would have the right to sue the federal government for just compensation. A court (presumably a 
federal court) would then determine how much the federal government must transfer to the state 
in order to compensate the state fully for the cost of administering the relevant program. The 
court’s role would be much the same as the Court of Federal Claims in the federal eminent 
domain context. 
 
Something like this was suggested by Justice Souter in his dissent in Printz.127 Justice Scalia 
responded wryly that Justice Souter’s suggestion “would create a constitutional jurisprudence (for 
determining when the compensation was adequate) that would make takings cases appear clear 
and simple.”128 Justice Scalia’s response carries considerable force.129 To illustrate the difficulty of 
the valuation exercise, imagine that the federal government commandeers state officials to 
implement a controversial deportation policy. Should the states be compensated only for the 
administrative costs of implementing the deportation policy, or should states in which the 
overwhelming majority of voters oppose the federal government’s deportation policy also be 
compensated for the disutility of having their own state administrative resources used in the 
service of a policy they deplore? If the former, then the risk that state administrative resources 
will be commandeered to implement a policy that the state’s voters oppose may operate as a 
disincentive against the state building up its own administrative capacity. If the latter, the 
valuation exercise becomes unmoored from any dollar figure that is ascertainable in the real 
world.   
 
One can also imagine a counterfactual in which the relevant entitlements allocated to 
states might be protected by an inalienability rule130: states would not be able to sell their services 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
rather than prohibiting exchanges for which there is mutual consent. On the relationship between the 
unconscionability doctrine and the Calabresi-Melamed framework, see generally Richard Craswell, 
Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 
(1993). 
126 See Hills, supra note 59, at 823. 
127 See Printz, 521 U.S. 898, 975-76 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Congress cannot 
“require administrative support without an obligation to pay fair value for it”). 
128 Id. at 914 n.7 (Scalia, J.). 
129 Accord Hills, supra note 59, at 935-36 (“Souter is wrong. Justice Scalia is perfectly correct to note that 
such a rule would be completely impractical.”). 
130 Erin Ryan has suggested that New York v. United States in fact established an inalienability rule. Erin 
Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability Rules in Tenth 
Amendment Infrastructure, 81 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1 (2010). She notes that public officials representing New 
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to the federal government, nor would they be allowed to waive their sovereign immunity in 
exchange for federal cash. That is, states would not be able to alienate their entitlements to their 
own administrative resources and their sovereign immunity. Ilya Somin has argued in this vein 
for a “categorical ban” on federal-to-state transfers, which would effectively shut down the now-
vibrant intergovernmental market.131 A consequence of such a ban would be to preclude 
Congress from enlisting the states to carry out federal programs even when states are the least-
cost administrators. While in some cases the federal government might implement the program 
on its own, in other cases the cost to the federal government of acquiring the administrative 
capacity necessary to implement the program might well prove prohibitive. 
 
The analysis here of liability and inalienability alternatives is necessarily speculative and 
concededly cursory. The conclusions can be summarized as follows: First, just as the allocation of 
entitlements to private property owners in the eminent domain context might encourage private-
sector investment, the rule in New York, Printz, Seminole Tribe, and Alden plausibly encourages 
investment by states in their own administrative capacity. Second, switching from a property rule 
to a liability rule might make it easier for Congress to take advantage of state administrative 
capabilities, and would reduce the risk of transaction costs getting in the way. On the other hand, 
the uncertainty of valuation under a liability rule might discourage states from building up 
administrative capabilities in the first place. Third, moving in the opposite direction from a 
property rule to an inalienability rule would raise the cost of new federal programs, because it 
would preclude Congress from enlisting the states when the states are the least-cost 
administrators. All in all, the allocation of the relevant entitlements and the decision to protect 
those entitlements with a property rule rather than a liability rule have ambiguous consequences 
for the combined size of federal and state governments, while an inalienability rule would 
unambiguously reduce the combined size of federal and state governments. 
 
D.  Borrowing by Federal and State Governments 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
York supported the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, the statute that 
supposedly commandeered the state. See id. at 36 & n.142. And she draws attention to an enigmatic line 
in Justice O’Connor’s opinion: “Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States, therefore, the 
departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of state officials.” New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992) (quoted at Ryan, supra, at 40). 
 Yet whatever Justice O’Connor might have meant, it is clear that state officials can consent to 
exchanges with Congress in which the states agree to administer federal programs. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 
132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601-02 (2012) (“We have long recognized that Congress ma use [its Spending Clause] 
power to grant federal funds to the States, and may condition such a grant upon the States taking certain 
actions that Congress could not require them to take.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Printz, 521 
U.S. at 936 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that state officials “may voluntarily continue to participate 
in the federal [background check] program,” and that “Congress is also free to amend the [background 
check] program to provide for its continuance on a contractual basis with the States if it wishes, as it does 
with a number of other federal programs”). The fact that state officials consent to compliance with a 
congressional mandate certainly can serve as “ratifi[cation],” notwithstanding Justice O’Connor’s 
suggestion to the contrary in New York. 
131 Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial Restriction of Federal 
Subsidies to State Governments, 90 Geo. L.J. 461, 495 (2002). 
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 So far the analysis in this essay has assumed that if a new cost is imposed on the federal 
government or on the states, the bearer of the cost must respond by either (a) raising taxes or (b) 
cutting spending. But there is of course a third option: borrowing. Or, more precisely, borrowing 
is a live option for the federal government: the states, by contrast, labor under balanced budget 
requirements that severely constrain their ability to borrow in response to a negative revenue 
shock.132  
 
 Constraints on state borrowing are not ironclad: states can export costs to future 
taxpayers by—inter alia—failing to fund public employee pensions and retiree health care. If we 
focus on debt to bondholders, however, state debt is tiny relative to federal debt: approximately 
3.7% of personal income across all states in 2013, while in the same year U.S. Treasury debt 
stood at more than 114% of personal income.133 These figures provide at least some indication 
that legal constraints on state borrowing have bite. Outside the pension and retirement context, 
states largely live by Polonius’s counsel to Laertes.134  
 
 Congress faces much looser restrictions on borrowing, and so much more leeway to shift 
costs to future taxpayers.135 To a first approximation, we might expect to see Congress borrowing 
up to the point that the marginal political cost of an additional $1 of debt equals the marginal 
political cost of an additional $1 of taxes. If marginal costs were unequal, then members of 
Congress could capture political gains by borrowing more or borrowing less. We might likewise 
expect that when additional fiscal burdens are shifted to the federal government, Congress will 
allocate some of those burdens to future taxpayers and some to taxpayers in the present period. 
In other words, we might expect that federalism doctrines allocating valuable entitlements to the 
states induce the federal government to borrow somewhat more than it otherwise would. 
 
 What are the distributional consequences of federal borrowing? The answer turns on 
several factors. First, we might expect that higher public debt levels will lead to higher 
inflation,136 which in turn will lead to redistribution from net creditor households (who tend to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 See David Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem, 98 Cal. 
L. Rev. 749, 755 (2010) (“Forty-nine of the U.S. states have some form of balanced-budget requirements. 
And even the one state that does not—Vermont—has generally acted as though so bound.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
133 For state figure, see Pew Charitable Trusts, Fiscal 50: State Trends and Analysis (May 17, 2016), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/multimedia/data-visualizations/2014/fiscal-50. For federal figure, see 
News Release, Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, State Personal Income 2013 (Mar. 25, 
2014), https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/spi/2014/pdf/spi0314.pdf; and U.S. Dep’t of the 
Treasury, Historical Debt Outstanding—Annual 2000-2015, 
https://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/histdebt/histdebt_histo5.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 
2017).  
134 See William Shakespeare, Hamlet act I, scene iii, line 74, at 196 (Ann Thompson & Neil Taylor, eds., 
Arden Shakespeare: Third Series, 2006) (“Neither a borrower nor a lender, boy . . . .”). 
135 On the efficacy of federal balanced budget rules, see generally Alan J. Auerbach, Federal Budget 
Rules: The US Experience, 15 Swed. Econ. Pol’y Rev. 57 (2008). 
136 Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff find that the United States is unusual among advanced 
economies in that it indeed exhibits a debt-inflation link. See Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 
Growth in a Time of Debt, 100 Am. Econ. Rev: Papers & Proc. 573 (2010).   
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wealthier) toward net borrowers (who tend to be poorer).137 Second, the distributional 
consequences of deficit spending depend in part on whether future governments finance interest 
and principal payments through spending cuts or tax hikes. Insofar as debt today leads to 
spending cuts tomorrow, then the burden of borrowing falls on the beneficiaries of future 
government spending. Insofar as debt today leads to higher taxes tomorrow, then the burden of 
borrowing falls to tomorrow’s taxpayers. If tomorrow’s federal tax system looks like today’s, then 
the brunt of that cost is borne by higher-income earners. Alternatively, if today’s rich reduce their 
consumption and increase their bequests to their children (presumably tomorrow’s rich) in order 
to offset their children’s future tax liabilities, then the burden of borrowing falls on more or less 
the same people who bear the brunt of present-period taxation. 
 
 Adding dimensions of intergenerational equity to the mix complicates the analysis 
considerably. If future generations are better off than the current generation, might we want to 
redistribute from tomorrow to today? Michael Doran and Daniel Shaviro have considered this 
question at length and in depth, and I will not reproduce their thoughtful analyses here.138 The 
important point for present purposes is that the allocation of entitlements across levels of 
government may affect the allocation of fiscal burdens across generations because the federal 
government is more prone to (and capable of) borrowing than the states. 
 
E.  Federalist Safeguards of Progressivity and Political Safeguards of Federalism 
 
 So far this essay has operated under the assumption that the judicial allocation of 
entitlements across levels of government actually matters to the intergovernmental distribution of 
wealth. Some scholars of federalism might dispute that assumption on the ground that ultimately, 
it’s politics up and down. The most famous articulation of this viewpoint is Herbert Wechsler’s 
1954 article “The Political Safeguards of Federalism,” in which Wechsler argues that states have 
wholly adequate mechanisms for defending their own interests without judicial intervention. In 
Wechsler’s view, Senators defend the interests of their states; state legislatures influence their 
House delegations by drawing districts and controlling voter qualifications, and the Electoral 
College requires presidential candidates to be responsive to state interests.139 Judicial doctrines do 
not protect state entitlements because political processes already accomplish that same end. 
 
 In a more recent updating of Wechsler’s thesis, Larry Kramer argues that party politics 
play the safeguarding role that Wechsler attributes to the formal institutions. Kramer posits that 
federal and state elected officials are mutually dependent on “decentralized” political parties that 
serve to link their electoral fortunes and thus align their interests. Kramer’s theory would suggest 
that members of Congress do not look to export fiscal burdens to the states where possible, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 See, e.g., Edward N. Wolff, The Distributional Effects of the 1969-75 Inflation on Holdings of 
Household Wealth in the United States, 25 Rev. Income & Wealth 195 (1979). 
138 See Michael Doran, Intergenerational Equity in Fiscal Policy Reform, 61 Tax L. Rev. 241 (2008); 
Daniel Shaviro, Do Deficits Matter (1997); Daniel Shaviro, The Long-Term U.S. Fiscal Gap: Is the Main 
Problem Generational Inequity?, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1298 (2009). 
139 Wechsler, supra note 18, at 546-57. 
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because members of Congress and state lawmakers are on the same team (or the same two teams, 
Team Red and Team Blue).140  
 
 On this view, federal grants to state and local governments are not payments to states for 
services rendered or for relinquishment of sovereign immunity. The strings attached to federal 
grants are in fact ribbons wrapped around gratuitous transfers. The federal government has an 
advantage vis-à-vis the states when it comes to revenue-raising, and federal elected officials 
generously use the federal tax system to muster funds for their own projects as well as their state-
level teammates. Litigation is an aberration. Cases like New York, Printz, Seminole Tribe, and Alden 
are exceptions and federal-state amity is the norm. 
 
 The idea of parties as the power centers of American politics may have taken a beating in 
the 2016 election, in which a candidate entirely independent from his political party ascended to 
the nomination and then the White House.141 And the idea that members of Congress are 
looking out for their co-partisans in the state houses stands at odds with models of political 
behavior that emphasize reelection or rent extraction as a lawmaker’s maximand.142 Moreover, 
party politics can have cross-cutting consequences for federal-state relations. On the one hand, 
partisan considerations may make federal officials more willing to bear revenue-raising 
responsibilities themselves and to share that revenue with their co-partisans at the state level. On 
the other hand, partisan considerations may serve to exacerbate federal-state tensions when 
federal and state governments are controlled by different parties. The conflict between 
Republican governors and the Obama administration regarding Medicaid expansion under the 
Affordable Care Act serves as a case in point,143 as does the conflict between Democratic mayors 
and the Trump administration regarding the participation of local law enforcement officials in 
deportation efforts.144 
 
 My goal here is not to adjudicate the debate between scholars such as Kramer, who view 
federal-state relations as fundamentally cooperative, and others who see federal-state interactions 
as competitive to the core.145 My objective is to explain how the intergovernmental distribution 
of wealth can affect the interpersonal distribution of wealth. If one believes that federal-to-state 
transfers spring from political rather than judicial origins, then it is the political safeguards of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 
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federalism that serve as safeguards of progressive taxation. Whether rooted in doctrine or in 
norms, however, the allocation of revenue-raising responsibilities to the federal government 
rather than the states still has a significant effect on the interpersonal allocation of resources. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The central argument of this essay is that federalism doctrines that allocate valuable 
entitlements to the states rather than the federal government can generate interpersonal as well 
as intergovernmental effects. Specifically, the allocation of valuable entitlements to states rather 
than to the federal government pushes more revenue-raising toward the federal tax system rather 
than state tax systems. Since the federal tax system is quite a bit more progressive than even the 
most progressive state tax systems, the likely net result of these entitlement allocations is to shift 
resources in a progressive direction. 
 
 The magnitude of the shift described above is difficult to estimate. If the $666.7 billion 
raised by the federal government and transferred to the states in fiscal year 2016 had been raised 
through the state systems instead, then—holding the progressivity of the federal and state systems 
constant, and relying on the figures in Table 1—we would expect the after-tax income of the top 
1% to rise by $53 billion (or 2.0% of cash income), and the after-tax income of the bottom 
quintile to fall by $19 billion (or 4.1% of cash income).146 These effects are not insignificant by 
any measure. But they should not be treated as lower or upper bounds. These projections may be 
too high if (as contemplated in Section IV.A) more state-level revenue-raising resulted in more 
progressive state tax structures. Conversely, these estimates may be too low if Congress—in the 
absence of an anti-commandeering doctrine—shifted responsibility for what are currently federal 
programs to the states. That is, the sum of federal-to-state transfers under the status quo is not 
necessarily a cap on the intergovernmental wealth effect of federalism doctrines, because there 
may be programs that the federal government administers itself today but that it would foist upon 
the states if it could. 
 
 While caution should be exercised in deriving dollar figures from the analysis above, 
caution should also be exercised in drawing doctrinal conclusions. Distribution is not the only 
consideration relevant to constitutional law. Conservatives who support federalism doctrines but 
also favor flatter tax rates should not necessarily reconsider their embrace of the former. Views 
regarding federalism doctrines will in most cases be motivated by nondistributional arguments 
that this essay does not question. The analysis here focuses on the consequences of—and not the 
justifications for—federalism’s allocation of entitlements to the states. 
 
If there is an insight that progressives and conservatives alike can draw from the analysis 
in this essay, it is—I hope—the following: The distribution of wealth across levels of government 
is inextricably intertwined with questions of interpersonal distribution. Accordingly, 
understanding the structure of inequality in the United States requires an understanding of our 
fiscal constitution. The relationship between federalism doctrines and wealth inequality is 
complex, but one conclusion seems to emerge clearly: the allocation of rights and responsibilities 
across levels of government has the potential to shape the allocation of resources across 
individuals, across households, and across generations.   
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